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ENTER YOSSARIAN: HOW TO RESOLVE THE
PROCEDURAL CATCH-22 THAT THE PRIVATE
SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT
CREATES
ELLIOTT J. WEISS*
JANET E. MOSER**
There was, of course a catch.
"Catch-22? " inquired Yossarian.
"Of course, " Colonel Korn answered pleasantly....
1. INTRODUCTION
The most striking aspect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 19951 is its rejection of the system of notice pleading that has governed all
civil actions in federal courts since 1938. "[P]rompted by significant
evidence of abuse in private securities lawsuits,"'2 Congress decided that a
new set of procedural rules should govern such actions. It was evidence that
the liberal pleading and discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure routinely had been exploited by attorneys specializing in
prosecuting securities class actions that led Congress to act. Congress found
that plaintiffs' attorneys frequently filed class action complaints alleging
securities fraud within hours or days after some unexpected news
precipitated a significant decline in the price of a public corporation's stock.4
* Charles E. Ares Professor of Law, University of Arizona College of Law.
** Certified Public Accountant; J.D. 1998, University of Arizona College of Law. The authors
wish to thank the participants in the University of Arizona College of Law faculty workshop and in the
1998 F. Hodge O'Neal Corporate & Securities Law Symposium, as well as Charles Ares, Adam
Pritchard, Henry Ruth, Tom Mauet and Joel Seligman, for helpful comments and Ryan Breeden for
valuable research assistance.
*** JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22: A CRITICAL EDITION 411 (Robert M. Scotto, ed.) (1973).
1. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter referred to as the "PSLRA," the
"Reform Act" or the "Act"].
2. H.R. REP. No. 104-369 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, at 59 (Jan. 10, 1996) [hereinafter Conf. Rep.].
3. Although Congress expressed concern primarily about class action alleging violations of
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.
240.10b-5, see Conf. Rep., supra note 2, many of the procedural rules set forth in the Reform Act
apply to all private actions brought under the 1934 Act. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (Supp. II 1996).
4. This "race to the courthouse" was exacerbated by courts' practice of naming as lead counsel
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These complaints often cited no evidence of wrongdoing. The attorneys
hoped that through discovery-which courts generally allowed to proceed
immediately after a complaint was filed-they would be able to uncover
sufficient evidence suggesting wrongdoing to allow them to file amended
complaints that would survive motions to dismiss. 5 Plaintiffs' attorneys then
would be in a position to threaten defendants with further, more extensive
discovery. Defendants, concerned about the substantial attorneys' fees and
disruption of business that such discovery entailed, often were willing to
settle plaintiffs' claims, even those that lacked merit, so long as the cost of
settling was not much more than the litigation costs defendants otherwise
would incur.6
The Reform Act contains four provisions designed (a) to make it more
difficult for a plaintiff to set forth a claim of securities fraud that will survive
a motion to dismiss and (b) to preclude a plaintiff from engaging in "fishing
expedition" discovery to develop the information necessary to state such a
claim.
The "All Facts Requirement--Plaintiff must specify in her
complaint "each statement alleged to have been misleading
[and] the reason or reasons why the statement is
misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or
omission is made on information and belief, the complaint
[also] shall state with particularity all facts on which that
belief is formed."7
* The "Strong Inference Requirement'--"[W]ith respect to
each act or omission alleged to violate" section 10(b) and
Rule 10(b)-5, plaintiff must "state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with [scienter]. ' 8
* The "Discovery Stay"-A court must dismiss any
complaint that does not meet both of the above
for the plaintiff class the attorney who filed the first complaint alleging securities fraud. See Conf.
Rep., supra note 2, at 68.
5. In an action alleging securities fraud, a complaint would have to both set forth a claim for
which relief could be granted, see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), and meet the more stringent pleading
requirements of FED. P, Civ. P. 9(b).
6. See Conf. Rep., supra note 2.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (Supp. II 1996). The bracketed words remedy some grammatical
flaws in the text of the statute.
8. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2).
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requirements 9 and, during the time a motion to dismiss is
pending, the court also must stay all discovery unless it
"finds upon the motion of any party that particularized
discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent
undue prejudice to that party."' 0
0 The "Sanctions Provision"--The court, upon final
adjudication of the action, is directed to make specific
findings concerning the compliance by each party with
each requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (b),
to impose sanctions against any party or attorney who it
finds has violated Rule 11(b), and, if it finds plaintiff's
complaint failed to comply with Rule 11(b), to presume
that the appropriate sanction is an amount equal to
defendants' "reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses
incurred in the action.""
The Conference Committee report makes clear that Congress' intent in
enacting these provisions was not to make it impossible for a defrauded
investor to initiate or maintain a securities class action. Indeed, the
Conference Committee explicitly recognized that "[t]he overriding purpose
of our Nation's security laws is to protect investors and maintain confidence
in the securities markets," that "[p]rivate securities litigation is an
indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their losses,"
and that "[s]uch private lawsuits [also] promote public and global confidence
in our capital markets and help to deter wrongdoing."'12 The Committee
stated that the goal of the Act was "to return the securities litigation system to
that high standard."' 3
Nonetheless, many questioned whether the Reform Act's procedural
provisions would create a Catch-22 that would preclude the prosecution of
potentially meritorious claims. President Clinton vetoed the Act in part
because he felt it would create a "procedural hurdle ... so high that even the
most aggrieved investors with the most painful losses may get tossed out of
court before they have a chance to prove their case."'14 Others argued that the
9. See id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A).
10. Id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).
11. Id. § 78u-4(c)(3)(A)(ii).
12. Conf. Rep., supra note 2, at 59.
13. Id.
14. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995-Veto Message From the President of the
United States, H.R. DOC. NO. 104-150, reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. H15215 (daily ed. Dec. 20,
1995) [hereinafter Veto Message].
1998]
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Act's pleading standards were too high and that the Discovery Stay would
make it impossible for many plaintiffs to craft complaints that would satisfy
those standards.1
5
Developments since Congress enacted the Reform Act over President
Clinton's veto suggest that the most extreme claims about the Act's
potentially Draconian impact were unfounded. Securities class actions
continue to be filed in roughly the same volume as was the case before the
Act was passed 16 and many complaints alleging open market fraud have
survived motions to dismiss. 17 Analysis suggests, however, that many of the
claims that have survived fall within one of three categories of open market
fraud cases that are largely unaffected by the Reform Act's procedural
requirements. These are (i) cases where the "bad news" statement that
precipitated a claim also made it clear that some earlier statement made by
defendants was false or misleading, such as when a corporation has restated
its earnings for some earlier period;18 (ii) cases where, in connection with the
"bad news" statement, some third party disclosed information that indicated
that one or more of a corporation's earlier statements were false or
misleading; 19 and (iii) cases where the temporal proximity between the "bad
news" statement and an "earlier, cheerier" 20 statement, combined with the
magnitude of the changes between the two, is itself sufficient to create a
strong inference that a corporation was aware of the bad news at the time it
made the earlier statement.2'
15. "It simply will be impossible for the plaintiff, without discovery, to meet the standard
inserted in the conference committee at the last minute." Securities Litigation Reform Act-Veto, 141
CONG. REC. S19,038 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (Remarks of Sen. Sarbanes, quoting letter from John
Sexton, Dean, New York University School of Law).
16. See Class Action Lawsuits Stage '97 Rebound Despite Legal Curbs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19,
1998, at B2 (reporting that SEC found the number of companies sued in securities class actions in
1997 was at same level as in years prior to passage of the Reform Act).
17. The office of the general counsel of the SEC has tallied post-Reform Act cases in which
courts have ruled on motions to dismiss. As of April 21, 1998, it had identified 78 such rulings. Courts
had denied motions to dismiss in 32 cases, denied motions to dismiss in part and granted them in part
in 8 cases, granted motions to dismiss with leave to amend in 27 cases, and granted motions to dismiss
with prejudice in I 1 cases. See Telephone conversation with David Levine, Special Assistant to the
General Counsel (Apr. 29, 1998).
18. See, e.g., Gross v. Medaphis Corp., 977 F. Supp. 1463 (N.D. Ga. 1997). A restatement
generally indicates an error in previously issued financial statements "resulting from mathematical
mistake, mistake in the application of accounting principles, or oversight or misuse offacts that existed
at the time the financial statements were prepared." ACCOUNTING CHANGES, ACCOUNTING
PRINCIPLES BULLETIN OPINION No. 20, para. 36 (July, 1971) (emphasis added).
19. Such as where, after a Valujet plane crashed in Florida, the FAA disclosed that Valujet had a
history of significant safety and maintenance problems that the company had not previously disclosed.
See In re Valujet, Inc. Sec. Litig., 984 F. Supp. 1427 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
20. In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1549 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
21. See In re Grand Casinos, Inc. Sec. Litig., 988 F. Supp. 1273, 1283 (D. Minn. 1997) (where
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The cases that remain the most problematic are those where an investor
suspects that a corporation has misrepresented material information but
cannot demonstrate that her suspicions have merit without obtaining access
to information that the corporation controls. Such cases have long brought
into tension two competing interests: The public's interest in having private
litigation, and the threat of such litigation, deter fraud in the securities
markets and provide a remedy for defrauded investors, and the public's
competing interest in deterring plaintiffs and their attorneys from employing
the litigation process to extract undeserved settlements from innocent
companies or to impose unnecessary costs on such companies.22
Prior to passage of the Reform Act, courts were inclined to provide a
plaintiff "some opportunity to conduct discovery of those [she] reasonably
suspected of having perpetrated a fraud" unless it appeared beyond doubt,
based on plaintiffs complaint, that she could 'prove no set of facts in
support of [her] claim that would entitle [her] to relief.' ' 23 This approach
reduced the risks that fraud would go unremedied, but increased the ability of
plaintiffs and their attorneys to extract undeserved settlements from innocent
defendants. Congress clearly intended to alter this balance when it passed the
Reform Act.24 However, Congress provided the courts with little guidance as
to how heavy a thumb it intended to place on defendants' side of the scale.25
We concluded that conducting a case study was a good way to assess the
probable impact of the Reform Act's procedural provisions on this
problematic class of cases. Before the Reform Act went into effect, plaintiffs
tended to rely on documents obtained through discovery to support their
claims, both because relying on discovery allowed plaintiffs to minimize
their investigatory costs26 and because documents obtained from defendants
corporation disclosed multi-million dollar cost overruns and major delays seven months after public
offering, court stated that "[c]ommon sense dictates that, unless there is some type of catastrophic
intervening event, construction and financing problems of this type and magnitude develop over time,"
and found it reasonable to infer that corporation was aware of these problems at time allegedly false or
misleading statements were made).
22. See In re Time Warner See. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied., 511 U.S.
1017 (1994).
23. Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,45-46 (1957)).
24. See supra text accompanying notes 1-11.
25. In Time Warner, the court noted that no matter how the balance is drawn, it will not be
possible to "avoid the risks of adverse consequences .... Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 264. Reading the
committee reports and the congressional debate on the Reform Act, one gets the impression that the
proponents of the Act believed the Act would eliminate all "strike suits" but would not result in the
dismissal (or non-prosecution) of a single meritorious claim. See generally Conf. Rep., supra note 2,
at 59-66; S. REP. No. 104-98 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, at 71-79; H.R. REP. No.
104-50 (1995), reprinted in 1995 WL 78795, at 143-46.
26. See Hillary A. Sale, Still "Pleading"for the Reform ofSecurities Litigation, 76 WASH. U.
L.Q. 537, 561-79 (1998) (discussing pre-Reform Act cases in which plaintiffs were able to satisfy Rule
1998]
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often constituted the most telling indicators of what defendants knew at the
time they made allegedly false or misleading statements.2 7 In the absence of
appellate decisions interpreting the Reform Act's pleading provisions, 28 we
believe, many plaintiffs have been testing whether courts will uphold
complaints comprised primarily of generic allegations concerning
information that defendants allegedly "knew" or reports that defendants
allegedly "possessed. ' 29 While we do not think courts should uphold such
complaints,30 we also thought it would be worthwhile to examine whether, in
a typical open market fraud case, a plaintiff would find it feasible to develop
information, from sources other than defendants' files, that would allow
plaintiff to set forth a valid claim of securities fraud.
We chose as the basis for our case study a claim that had been asserted
against Green Tree Financial Corp. ("GTE"), the leading lender to purchasers
of manufactured housing in the United States, Lawrence Coss, GTF's chief
executive officer, and others. This securities fraud claim was precipitated by
GTF's November 13, 1997 announcement that in the fourth quarter of 1997
it planned to add $125 million to $150 million (on a pre-tax basis) to reserves
to reflect unexpectedly high prepayments that GTF had received with respect
to outstanding loans.3' The addition to reserves was necessary because such
prepayments reduced the value to GTF of interests it had retained in
manufactured housing loans that it had made and then securitized.32
The timing of GTF's announcement aroused suspicion because 1997 was
the first year after a unique incentive compensation contract between Mr.
9(b) with information they found in defendants' files); Elliott J. Weiss, The New Securities Fraud
Pleading Requirements: Speed Bump or Road Block?, 38 ARIz. L. REv. 675, 706, n.187 (1996)
(listing cases in which securities fraud complaints were dismissed and plaintiffs then filed amended
complaints, all of which included additional information gleaned from defendants' files, that courts
held satisfied Rule 9(b)).
27. See In re GlenFed Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1544 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (noting that a
plaintiff can set forth the circumstances constituting fraud "most directly by pointing to inconsistent
contemporaneous statements (such as internal reports) which were made by or available to the
defendants.").
28. The only appellate decision interpreting the Reform Act's procedural provisions is Medhekar
v. District Court, 99 F.3d 325 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that initial disclosure constitutes "discovery or
other proceedings" under the Reform Act). At the time this Article was written, appeals of three
district court decisions interpreting the Act's pleading requirements were pending in Circuit Courts of
Appeals. See Hoffman v. Comshare (E.D. Mich. 1997), appeal docketed, No. 97-2098 (7th Cir. Oct.,
9, 1997); In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Lit., 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997), appeal docketed,
No. 97-16204 (9th Cir. July 9, 1997); Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Cal. 1997), appeal
docketed, No. 97-16070 (9th Cir. June 18, 1997).
29. The validity of such complaints is a central issue in both Silicon Graphics, and Zeid.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 55-64.
31. See Green Tree Issued Revised Fourth Quarter Earnings Expectations, GREEN TREE FIN.
CORP., Press Release, Nov. 13, 1997.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 82-85.
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Coss and GTF had expired. That contract obligated GTF to pay Mr. Coss an
annual bonus equal to 2.5% of GTF's pre-tax profits and resulted in GTF
paying Mr. Coss $65 million in 1995 and $102 million in 1996.33
Following GTF's November 13 announcement, the price of GTF stock
declined by 19%. About three weeks later, the first of three class action
complaints was filed alleging that GTF, Coss, and others had misrepresented
GTF's earnings for 1996 and the first three quarters of 1997.
Had the allegations in the first complaints filed against GTF remained the
basis of an ongoing securities fraud litigation, concern about the effect our
research might have on that litigation would have made us reluctant to
publish a case study of those claims. However, subsequent developments
mooted that concern. On January 27, 1998, GTF issued a press release stating
that, as a consequence of further review, it would restate (reduce) its reported
income for 1996-and would also add an even larger amount to reserves in
the fourth quarter of 1997-to account for increased prepayments of
outstanding loans.34 As a result of the January 27 announcement, it became
clear that plaintiffs (a) would amend their complaints to reflect the
information in GTF's January 27 press release 35 and (b) would find it far
easier to craft claims against GTF that would survive a motion to dismiss.
This was evident because the January 27 release strongly suggested that, as
of the date GTF issued its 1996 annual report, GTF had access to and should
have taken account of information about prepayments that would have led itm r 36
to report substantially less income for 1996.
With these concerns aside, the allegations that had been made or that
could have been made against GTF following its November 13, 1997 press
release seemed to provide an ideal basis for a case study. We would proceed
on the assumption that GTF, instead of issuing its January 27 press release,
tried to keep secret the information that led it to restate its earnings for 1996.
We then had a situation (a) in which a plaintiffs' attorney reasonably could
have suspected a fraud had occurred, (b) in which-as GTF's subsequent
restatement indicated-there was evidence indicating GTF's 1996 financial
33. For further description of this contract, see infra text accompanying notes 195-200.
34. See GREEN TREE FIN. CORP., Press Release, Jan. 27, 1998.
35. Indeed, within eight days after the January 27 announcement, notices of five new or amended
complaints filed against GTF were posted on wire services. (Based on search of Westlaw
WIRESPLUS database, using search terms "Green Tree," "Class Action" and "Lead Plaintiff'.)
36. See supra note 18. On April 7, 1998, as we were completing our study, GTF and Conseco,
Inc. announced that Conseco had agreed to acquire GTF in a stock swap valued at $6.44 billion. See
Conseco Agrees to Acquire Green Tree, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1998, at A2. That announcement also
seemed likely to affect the value, if not the merits, of the securities fraud claims pending against GTF.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c) (Supp. 11 1996) (providing that damages shall not exceed the mean trading
price of a corporation's stock during the 90 day period following corrective disclosure).
1998]
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statements were false or misleading, but (c) in which at least some of the
information indicating those statements were false or misleading was under
GTF's exclusive control. To study this type of problematic case, we decided
to investigate whether it would have been possible for a plaintiffs' attorney,
without discovery, to develop sufficient evidence to flesh out a claim that
GTF had violated section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 that would satisfy the
Reform Act's pleading requirements.
Section II of this Article sets forth our understanding of what the Reform
Act requires a plaintiff to set forth in a complaint to state a valid claim that a
corporation has made false or misleading public statements in violation of
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Section III describes our case study of GTF.
Section IV analyzes the options a court would face in a case similar to the
"quasi-hypothetical" we studied and suggests the option we believe a court
should choose.
II. WHAT THE REFORM AcT REQUIRES A PLAINTIFF TO PLEAD
To conduct a case study of the problems that would confront a plaintiff
attempting to set forth a valid claim of securities fraud against GTF,37 we
first had to make some assumptions concerning what the Reform Act
requires a plaintiff to include in her complaint. We had no personal
knowledge of any facts relating to GTF and consequently assumed that any
allegations we (or any plaintiff) made would be based on information and
belief.38 We also knew that we would have to do more than simply assert
that, at the time GTF issued its financial statements for 1996,39 it knew (and
failed to disclose) the information concerning prepayments that it disclosed
in its November 13, 1997 press release. Courts have made clear that, where
disclosure of some fact precipitates a sharp drop in the price of a company's
stock, a plaintiff cannot satisfy Rule 9(b) with such a plea of "fraud by
37. We assumed that claims of securities fraud, if viable, would be made against both GTF and
Mr. Coss. However, for purposes of brevity, we refer either to claims "against GTF" or "against
defendants."
38. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746, 763 (N.D. Cal. 1997), appeal
docketed, No. 97-16204 (9th Cir. July 9, 1997) (where sources cited in complaint "do not provide
plaintiffs with personal knowledge, the complaint must be based on information and belief-that is the
only alternative.") But cf Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F. Supp. 910, 915 (N.D. Cal. 1997), appeal
docketed, No. 97-16070 (9th Cir. June 18, 1997) (holding that where plaintiff based allegations on
"investigation of counsel, "plaintiff "cannot rely on conclusory allegations or tenuous inferences but
instead, must allege with particularity: (1) each statement, (2) why each statement is false, and (3) as to
each statement, facts giving rise to a strong inference that Defendants acted with scienter.")
39. As explained above, see supra text accompanying notes 31-36, we focused our case study on
GTF's financial statements for 1996. See Complaint, Chill v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., No. 97-CV-2666
(D. Minn., filed Dec. 2, 1997).
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hindsight. ' O
At the same time, courts have not developed any consensus concerning
how the pleading provisions of the Reform Act should be interpreted. The
language of the All Facts and Strong Inference Requirements is somewhat
ambiguous, as is their legislative history.4' District courts have adopted
sharply different interpretations of those requirements, 42 and, as of the time
we completed this Article, no appellate decisions interpreting them had been
handed down.43 Moreover, circuit courts of appeals have developed different,
arguably relevant, views concerning how Rule 9(b) applies to plaintiffs who
assert claims of disclosure fraud.
44
Our approach to this uncertainty was to develop our own assumptions as
to how the All Facts and Strong Inference Requirements should be
interpreted. We started by focusing on the language and legislative history of
those two provisions. We viewed all the Reform Act's procedural provisions
as parts of an integrated whole and attempted to develop an interpretation of
the Act's two pleading provisions that was consistent with the Discovery
Stay and the Sanctions Provision. Finally, we tried to keep in mind what we
understand to be Congress' overarching goal--deterring claims of disclosure
fraud by plaintiffs who lack evidence that a public corporation or its officials
has misrepresented material facts, and preventing plaintiffs from engaging in
"fishing expedition" discovery to ascertain if such facts exist. Also we kept in
mind Congress' desire to preserve investors' ability to maintain private
actions against those who have injured them by making materially false or
misleading statements that affect the price of publicly traded securities.
45
Our principal task was to develop an understanding of what the Reform
40. See In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1549 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc); Greenstone
v. Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d 22, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1992); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 941 (1990); Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 469-70 (2d Cir.1978)
(Friendly, J.).
41. See, e.g., In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 242 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
The district courts that have considered this issue [the Reform Act's pleading requirements] in
terms of legislative history are again divided as to the result.... This is hardly surprising, since the
Congressional byplay that accompanies the enactment of a controversial law like the Reform Act
inevitably yields a rich cornucopia of legislative history on which courts of every appetite can
feed. But when it comes to interpreting such byplay, courts are poorly equipped to separate the
husks from the kernels.
Id.
42. See Steven B. Rosenfeld, Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of'1995, _ REV. SEC. & COMMOD. REG. _ (forthcoming 1998) (surveying cases).
43. Three cases were on appeal. See supra note 28.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 50-64.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13. Congress, as is typical, failed to acknowledge the
tension between these goals.
1998)
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Act requires a plaintiff to include in a complaint to state a valid claim that a
defendant has (i) misrepresented one or more material facts (ii) with an intent
to deceive or defraud.46 We recognized that, in many cases, facts that suggest
that a statement was materially false or misleading will also suggest that a
defendant acted knowingly or recklessly47 when she issued that statement.48
We also concluded that even where facts in a complaint strongly suggest a
defendant had motive to misrepresent material facts-as would be the case
with GTF and Mr. Coss' incentive compensation contract&9 -the plaintiff
46. Plaintiff also must be able to plead (and then prove) reliance, but if plaintiff purchased the
securities in question in an active public market, reliance will be presumed. See Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988). Plaintiff also must plead and prove causation, but if the price of
the securities in question fell after defendant's deception was disclosed, this element is easily satisfied.
47. Some courts have concluded that facts suggesting a defendant acted recklessly cannot satisfy
the Reform Act's pleading requirements. See e.g., Friedberg v. Discreet Logic, Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42,
49 n.2 (D. Mass. 1997) ("In light of the fact that the PSLRA has eliminated recklessness, this Court is
of the opinion that conscious behavior can now only take the form of circumstantial evidence
indicating intent to defraud or knowledge of the falsity.") However, we find more persuasive the cases
that hold nothing in the text of the Act or its legislative history suggests that Congress intended to
reject the view, subscribed to by eleven courts of appeal, see Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914
F.2d 1564, 1568 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976 (1991), that proof of recklessness is
sufficient to establish scienter. See Queen Uno, Ltd. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., No. Civ. A. 97-
WY-1431-C8, 1998 WL 195299, *10 (D. Colo. Apr. 13, 1998) ("There is little indication that
Congress intended via the Reform Act to alter securities fraud liability for this type of recklessness
conduct."); In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CV-S-96-0708-PMP (RLH), 1998 WL 167259, *6
(D. Nev. Apr. 2, 1998) ("This court does not believe that Congress would abolish the well established
use of recklessness as permissible scienter under the securities laws without expressly stating so in the
language of the statute."); In re Glenayre Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., 982 F. Supp. 294, 298 (S.D.N.Y.
1997)
[Tihe statute did not change the substantive law but merely the pleading requirement necessary to
survive a motion to dismiss, i.e., that the complaint state facts raising a strong inference of
scienter. The required scienter, however, remains the same, and has long been held in this Circuit
(and others) to include conscious recklessness.
Id.; In re Health Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192, 201 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
("[R]ecklessness is sufficient to plead a strong inference of fraudulent intent under the PSLRA."); In
re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
In the securities fraud context, then, "recklessness" is a state of mind-one that may be
particularly applicable to cases involving corporate entities, whose "intent" is necessarily a legal
construct-and one that most Circuits have held is sufficient to meet the Hochfelder definition of
scienter. While the Supreme Court remains free to overrule that determination, nothing in the
Reform Act purports to do so, and the few cases that might be read to suggest otherwise have
simply, in this Court's view, substituted a selective reading of the convoluted legislative history
for the clear and unambiguous language of the statute.
Id.
48. See In re GlenFed Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1549 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) ("Setting
forth contemporaneous statements or conditions [indicating that a statement was false or misleading
when made] may well have the incidental effect of causing plaintiff to allege circumstances from
which scienter can be inferred.").
49. Le., that Mr. Coss' bonus in 1996 would increase by an amount equal to 22% of each dollar
in pre-tax earnings that GTF reported, that this arrangement expired at the end of 1996, and that Mr.
Coss therefore had a strong incentive to defer recognition of any losses GTF incurred as a result of
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still must plead particularized facts indicating that a defendant knowingly or
recklessly misrepresented material information.
Both common sense and the language of the Strong Inference
Requirement support this conclusion. Every person that has a motive to
defraud surely does not act on that motive. Moreover, the Reform Act
provides that a plaintiff must plead facts that give rise to "a strong inference
that the defendant acted with" an intent to deceive or defraud, not simply that
she had a motive to deceive or defraud. In addition, even if one assumes, as
did we, that a court can use the two-part test first set forth in Beck v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.,50 to determine whether a plaintiff has met
the Strong Inference Requirement, it is important to remember that Beck held
both (i) that a plaintiff could establish a "strong inference of scienter" by
alleging either that defendant had "a motive for committing fraud and a clear
opportunity for doing so" or "circumstances indicating conscious behavior by
the defendant" 51 and (ii) that "[w]here motive is not apparent, ... the strength
of the [plaintiffs] circumstantial allegations must be correspondingly
greater."52 The clear implication of the emphasized phrase is that, even
where motive is apparent, some factual allegations indicating that a
defendant consciously or recklessly53 misrepresented a material fact also are
required.
54
unanticipatedly high prepayments until 1997. See supra text accompanying notes 195-202. See also
Professional Management Assoc., Inc. v. Coss, 574 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
shareholders were excused from presuit demand in derivative action alleging corporate waste
involving Coss' compensation package).
We assumed that any court would consider it relevant that Mr. Coss' incentive compensation
contract gave him a strong motive to maximize GTF's reported earnings in 1996. Some pre-Reform
Act decisions can be read to suggest that a plaintiff should never be allowed to claim that a corporate
manager was motivated to misrepresent material facts by a desire to enhance his incentive
compensation, see Acito v. Imeera Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1995); Shields v. Citytrust
Bancorp., Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994); Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d
1061 (5th Cir. 1994), but those cases involved generalized claims that could be made with respect to
almost any corporation. It seemed nonsensical to believe that the particularized facts suggesting
motive that a plaintiff could allege with respect to Mr. Coss were not pertinent. See Weiss, supra note
26, at 700-02.
50. 820 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 (1988). For a summary of the
legislative history of the Strong Inference Requirement, see Weiss, supra note 26, at 681-83.
51. Beck, 820 F.2d at 50.
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Subsequent to Beck, the Second Circuit made clear that circumstantial evidence that a
defendant had acted recklessly also would suffice. See In re Time Warner Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 269
(2d Cir. 1993).
54. A few Second Circuit decisions can be read to suggest that a plaintiff could satisfy Rule 9(b)
simply by pleading facts giving rise to a strong inference that a corporation or its managers had a
motive and the opportunity to misrepresent material facts. See Weiss, supra note 26, at 689-90,
discussing Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 263. However, the very structure of the Second Circuit's test
suggests this was not (or should not have been) the case. After all, if no showing of falsity was
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We also concluded that the All Facts Requirement places a significant
interpretive gloss on the Strong Inference Requirement. The key issue raised
by most motions to dismiss will be whether plaintiff has stated with
particularity facts "giving rise to a strong inference" that the defendant acted
with the requisite intent. The more specifics a plaintiff provides about her
basis for allegations made on information and belief, the easier a court should
find it to decide that her allegations give rise to the requisite strong inference.
The less information a plaintiff provides about her sources, the greater the
likelihood that the court will dismiss her complaint.
At the extreme, we assumed that a court always should dismiss a
complaint comprised largely of unsubstantiated allegations that a defendant
"knew" or "possessed" some later disclosed information at the time she made
some allegedly false or misleading statement. We saw no real functional
difference between such a complaint and one that alleges "fraud by
hindsight." After all, in virtually every situation in which a corporation
announces some unexpected development, a plaintiff could find it easy to
assert that the corporation had knowledge of that development, or of
information foreshadowing that development, at the time some earlier
statement was made.
To allow a plaintiff to proceed on the basis of such allegations, in our
view, would undermine Congress' goal of protecting defendants from having
to incur substantial costs to respond to speculative and unsubstantiated claims
of securities fraud.55 Courts have recognized this danger for many years.
Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd.56 pointed out that a central purpose of Rule
required, it would make no sense to require "correspondingly stronger" evidence of reckless or
conscious wrongdoing in the absence of motive and opportunity.
55. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746, 767 (N.D. Cal. 1977), appeal
docketed, No. 97-16204 (9th Cir. July 9, 1997) ("If the Court allowed plaintiffs to go forward [on the
basis of "generic" allegations concerning defendant corporation's internal reports], the strengthened
standard of the [Reform Act] would lose its meaning.") See also Novak v. Kasaks, No. 96 Civ. 3073
(AGS), 1998 WL 107033, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 1998) (dismissing complaint where key "paragraph
provides none of the required facts underlying the complaint's allegations as to the information that
was available to the individual defendants, nor does it direct the Court to where those facts might be
found."); Molinari v. Symantec Corp., No. C-97-20021-JN, 1998 WL 78120, *6-*7 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
17, 1998) (Court found that plaintiffs' allegations concerning why defendant's statements concerning
"early sales" are false or misleading "are too conclusory and lack the necessary factual specificity"
where "[p]laintiffs allege[d], without any factual support, that Defendants knew that (1) retailers' sales
of Symantec's products were not meeting expectations; (2) the 'attach' rate was overstated; and (3)
Windows 95 products were not selling well at retail and products were being returned to Symantec."
Court also held that "most of the [plaintiffs'] allegations regarding Enterprise products are too vague
and conclusory to satisfy the pleading requirements." For example, plaintiff pled "no facts . . . to
support [their] allegation that Defendants already knew sales of Symantec's Enterprise products were
not meeting with success, were not 'well-received,' or were failing to gain market share.").
56. 681F.2d II1 (2dCir. 1982).
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9(b) was to prevent a plaintiff from relying on "conclusory allegations... to
set off on a long and expensive discovery process in the hope of uncovering
some sort of wrongdoing or of obtaining a substantial settlement.'' 57 In
Greenstone v. Cambex, Inc.,58 Judge (now Justice) Stephen Breyer held that
Rule 9(b) requires a plaintiff alleging securities fraud to "set[] forth specific
facts that make it reasonable to believe that defendant knew that a statement
was materially false or misleading., 59 More recently, Parnes v. Gateway
2000, Inc.60 held a complaint was "entirely lacking in the particularity
required by Rule 9(b)"6' because it did not (i) "identify the goods and
services allegedly purchased and sold by Gateway at deflated and inflated
prices[,]" (ii) "allege the amount of fraudulent profit allegedly obtained by
Gateway[,]" or (iii) "provide the source for" plaintiffs' allegation "that a total
of $10,000,000 in goods and services were [fraudulently] bought and sold. 62
Two recent Ninth Circuit decisions reflect a different point of view. Both
appear to treat unsubstantiated allegations, which a plaintiff could have made
by relating a corporation's disclosure of unexpected adverse developments to
publicly available information about that corporation's business, as
sufficiently particularized to satisfy Rule 9(b).63 Those decisions conflict
with the decisions of other circuit courts of appeal noted above and, if
applied to post-Reform Act cases, would undermine Congress' goals. They
also, in our view, misinterpret In re GlenFed, Inc. Securities Litigation, in
which an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit observed:
Securities fraud cases often involve some more or less catastrophic
event occurring between the time the complained-of statement was
57. Id. at 116.
58. 975 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1992) (Breyer, J.).
59. Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
60. 122 F.3d 539 (8th Cir. 1997).
61. Id. at 550.
62. Id. See also Serabian v. Amoskeag Bank Shares, Inc., 24 F.3d 357, 365 (1st Cir. 1994)
(upholding complaint in which "plaintiffs specifically identify the internal reports and the public
statements underlying their claims, providing names and dates."); Romani v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, 929 F.2d 875, 878 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that where "allegations of fraud are explicitly or, as
in this case, implicitly, based only on information and belief, the complaint must set forth the source of
the information and the reasons for the belief.")
63. See Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1136
(1996) (holding to be sufficiently particularized allegations of evidentiary fact plaintiffs'
uncorroborated assertions that "initial sales volumes of Price Company's stores newly opened during
Class Period were below levels usually experienced upon new store openings and levels necessary for
the stores to achieve profitable operations" and that "recent store openings in [various locations] were
proceeding poorly and most of these units were losing money."); Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 627
(9th Cir. 1998) ("declinfing] to require that a complaint must allege specific shipments to specific
customers at specific times with a specific dollar amount of improperly recognized revenue").
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made and the time a more sobering truth is revealed (precipitating a
drop in stock price).... When such an event has occurred, it is clearly
insufficient for plaintiffs to say that the later, sobering revelations
make the earlier, cheerier statement a falsehood. In the face of such
intervening events, a plaintiff must set forth, as part of the
circumstances constituting fraud, an explanation as to why the
disputed statement was untrue or misleading when made. This can be
done most directly by pointing to inconsistent contemporaneous
statements or information (such as internal reports) which were made
by or available to the defendants. 64
The Discovery Stay and the Sanctions Provision buttress our conclusion.
The Discovery Stay reflects Congress' judgment that before a plaintiff will
be allowed to impose the costs of discovery on those she charges with
securities fraud, she should be required to demonstrate that facts exist that
make it reasonable to believe a fraud has occurred. If she cannot-if the only
facts a plaintiff can point to are unexpected changes in a corporation's
circumstances that she alleges defendants were aware of, or recklessly
disregarded, at some earlier date-then plaintiffs complaint should be
dismissed.
Congress enacted the Sanctions Provision to give Rule 11 some real
bite.65 Prior to the passage of the Reform Act, a plaintiff who made
speculative allegations on information and belief, and then was unable to
produce evidence that supported those allegations, could claim that she had a
reasonable belief that discovery would produce such evidence.66 What
constitutes "a reasonable belief' in these circumstances is very nebulous; a
plaintiffs informed guess that the defendants may have known certain facts
probably is sufficient. Consequently, Rule 11 did almost nothing to deter
plaintiffs (and their attorneys) from initiating class actions on the basis of
speculative, but potentially lucrative, claims of securities fraud.67
64. In re GlenFed, Inc. See. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548-49 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc). See also id.
at 1552 (holding certain of plaintiffs' allegations insufficiently particularized because although
defendant's "statements are identified, and their falseness is alleged, but 'the reasons for their falsity'
are not set forth.") (citation omitted).
65. See Conf. Rep., supra note 2, at 84. ("The legislation gives teeth to Rule 11.
66. FED. R. CIv. P. 11(b)(3) allows a party to make factual allegations that do not have
evidentiary support but that the party reasonably believes "are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery." The rule was designed to tolerate
speculative allegations where a litigant has "good reason to believe that a fact is true or false but may
need discovery, formal or informal, from opposing parties or third persons to gather and confirm the
evidentiary basis for the allegation." Excerpt From the Report of the Judicial Conference Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 515, 585 (1992).
67. See Conf. Rep., supra note 2, at 84 ("Existing Rule 11 has not deterred abusive securities
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If courts interpret the All Facts Requirement as we believe they should,
Rule 11 should deter speculative claims.68 Once courts make it clear that a
complaint alleging disclosure fraud that relies on unsubstantiated allegations
concerning what defendants knew will not suffice, a plaintiff (or her
attorney) who files what she then should know is an inadequate complaint
should be subject to sanctions equal to all attorneys' fees and expenses
defendants have incurred.69 On the other hand, if a plaintiff attempts to avoid
dismissal by asserting that she possesses evidence that supports claims she
has made on information and belief and a court subsequently determines that
a plaintiff had no such evidence, a plaintiff (or her attorney) also should be
subject to sanctions equal to all attorneys' fees and expenses defendants have
incurred.70
A potential plaintiff who suspects fraud, but who does not have sufficient
evidence to support a strong inference that a defendant deliberately or
recklessly made a materially false or misleading statement will have only one
attractive alternative. Before filing a complaint alleging securities fraud, she
will need to conduct an investigation to determine whether such evidence
exists.71 That is the burden Congress decided a plaintiff should bear before
litigation.").
68. This assumes that successful defendants will have some interest in pursuing claims that
plaintiffs have not complied with Rule 11 or that courts will have some interest in reviewing plaintiffs'
compliance with that rule. Practitioners have expressed doubt as to whether either will prove to be the
case. See Litigation Reform Panelists Dispute Reform Law's Impact on Private Securities Fraud
Litigation, 29 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1134, 1135 (Aug. 15, 1997).
69. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c) (Supp. 111996).
70. For example, a court should have little difficulty finding that plaintiff (or her attorney) did
not proceed in good faith if a complaint states that a certain allegations are based on information
obtained from former employees of a corporation and plaintiff subsequently is not able to produce any
former employee who can provide evidence to support those allegations.
71. If a plaintiff discovers such evidence exists, we believe she retains considerable discretion as
to how much detail to include in her complaint concerning her sources. The point of the exercise, after
all, is for a plaintiff to plead specific facts that make it reasonable to believe the statements at issue
were false or misleading at the time they were made. The more specifics a plaintiff provides about the
sources that support her allegations, the more likely it is that a court will find her allegations are
sufficient to support such a belief. If a plaintiff concludes that she can support a reasonable belief that
the defendants misrepresented material facts without disclosing all her sources or, in the case of a live
witness, without disclosing the identity of that witness, she should be free to do so. As noted above,
see supra text accompanying note 69, if a plaintiff subsequently is unable to produce such a witness,
she faces the probability of being subjected to substantial sanctions.
Consequently, we disagree with the court's holding in Silicon Graphics that a plaintiff must
disclose in her complaint the names of all persons on whose testimony she has relied. See In re Silicon
Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746, 763 (N.D. Cal. 1997), appeal docketed, No. 97-16204
(9th Cir. July 9, 1997). Courts need not to interpret the term "all facts" to embody such a requirement,
and we do not believe that statements made on the floor by two members of Congress who opposed
the House version of the Reform Act (which is the legislative history on which the court relied)
represents authoritative statements of what Congress intended.
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being able to saddle a defendant with the costs associated with responding to
a claim of securities fraud. Our case study was directed at trying to determine
whether a plaintiff could bear that burden with respect to claims that GTF
and Mr. Coss had violated section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5.
III. COULD A PLAINTIFF HAVE MADE A VALID CLAIM AGAINST
GREEN TREE?
GTF's November 13, 1997 press release and remarks made by GTF
officials to investors during a conference call the following day gave rise to a
suspicion that GTF substantially overstated its income for 1996 and the first
three quarters of 1997.72 Our case study focused on whether, using
information that was publicly available prior to January 27, 1998, when GTF
announced it would restate its income for 1996, a plaintiff would have been
able to make out a claim of securities fraud against GTF and Mr. Coss that
would have satisfied both the requirements of Rule 9(b) and the pleading
requirements of the Reform Act. To address that issue, we first developed an
understanding of GTF's business and operations.
A. GTF's Business and Operations
GTF, a publicly traded company listed on the New York Stock Exchange,
had 136 million shares outstanding at September 30, 1997.73 GTF describes
itself as a "diversified financial services company that provides financing for
manufactured homes, home equity, home improvements, consumer products
and equipment and provides consumer and commercial revolving credit."
74
GTF is the largest manufactured housing lender in the United States,
originating approximately 30% of the industry's volume during the past
several years.75 Manufactured housing loans accounted for 64% of the loans
72. The first class action complaint against GTF was filed on behalf of investors who purchased
GTF stock between Jan. 30, 1996, and December 11, 1997. See Complaint, Chill v. Green Tree Fin.
Corp., No. 97-CV-2666 (D. Minn., filed Dec. 2, 1997). It thus suggested that GTF's financials for
1995 also were false or misleading. However, we limited our inquiries to facts relevant to GTF's 1996
financials.
73. See GREEN TREE FIN. CORP., QUARTERLY REPORT (Sept. 30, 1997) [hereinafter GTF SEPT.
30, 1997 QUARTERLY REPORT].
74. GREEN TREE FIN. CORP., 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 13 (1997) [hereinafter 1996 GTE ANNUAL
REPORT].
75. See Thomas Facciola, Green Tree: Initiating Coverage with a 2-Outperform Rating, First
Call Notes (Lehman Bros.), Mar. 21, 1997. See also, Paul A. Mackey, DWR Initiates Coverage of
Green Tree Financial With a Buy; Target $36, First Call Notes (Dean Witter), Jan. 24, 1996 (noting
that GTF originated 28% of the $10 billion 1995 volume of new manufactured housing loans).
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originated by GTF's in 199676 and 51% for the first nine months of 1997."
GTF is also the largest servicer of manufactured housing loans. Its servicing
portfolio, approximately $26 billion as of September 30, 1997,78 represented
approximately thirty percent of the manufactured housing loans outstanding
in the United States.79
GTF practically invented the market for manufactured housing loans.
Such loans had been classified as "sub-prime" for two reasons. First,
manufactured housing (i.e., mobile homes) generally is less durable than
conventional housing and therefore is more likely to deteriorate in value over
the life of a mortgage. Second, purchasers of manufactured housing often
have spotty credit records.80
As a consequence, at least through the early 1990s GTF was able to
charge considerably higher interest rates on loans to purchase manufactured
housing-typically 200 to 400 basis points above the rates charged on
residential mortgages.81 Furthermore, GTF's mortgagees, in addition to being
less credit worthy than purchasers of conventional housing, generally also
were less financially sophisticated. As a consequence, they were less likely to
attempt to refinance their loans when interest rates declined. Moreover,
because GTF dominated the market for manufactured housing loans in
certain parts of the country, its borrowers were less likely to have access to
other lenders prepared to refinance their mortgages.
GTF also was a major force in financial markets. It regularly sold debt
instruments to institutional and other investors that were secured by bundles
of loans GTF had originated. In a typical transaction, GTF would sell
multiple classes of senior and subordinated pass-through certificates, each of
which gave the holder defined rights to payments of principal and interest
that mortgagees were obligated to make with respect to the underlying
manufactured housing loans.82 These securitization transactions provided
76. See 1996 GTF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74 ($4.482 billion of the $7.565 billion
originated in 1996).
77. See GTF SEPT. 30, 1997 QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 73 ($4.111 billion of the $8.086
billion originated).
78. See id.
79. See Jennifer 0. Martin, Green Tree Financial: Reiterating Strong Buy After Surprise Wite
Down, First Call Notes (Morgan Stanley), Nov. 17, 1997. As a loan servicer, GTF collected
mortgagees' monthly payments, maintained escrow accounts, monitored delinquencies, and remitted
payments of principal and interest to the holders of pass-through certificates.
80. See Steven Davidson, Financing Manufactured Housing, AM. COMMuNITY BANKER, Nov. 1,
1997, at 38.
81. See id. GTF's average annual spreads were 3.6%, 3.8% and 3.1% in 1994, 1995, and 1996,
respectively. See 1996 GTF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 15.
82. See id. at 4. GTF sometimes provided credit enhancements, such as corporate guarantees,
bank letters of credit, surety bonds, cash deposits or other collateral to enhance the marketability of
1998]
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GTF with cash that it needed to finance its operations. In 1995, GTF
packaged and sold manufactured housing loans totaling $5.3 billion; in 1996,
it packaged and sold manufactured housing loans totaling $8.4 billion.83
In these securitization transactions, GTF did not sell its entire interest in
the underlying loans. Rather, GTF agreed to pay fixed rates of interest with
respect to the pass-through certificates and retained the right to keep all
payments of principal, interest and fees that it collected in excess of the
amounts it was obliged to turn over to the holders of the pass-through
certificates.84 These retained rights had substantial value for two reasons.
First, the manufactured housing mortgages that secured the pass-through
certificates bore rates of interest substantially higher than the interest GTF
was required to pay on the pass-through certificates. Second, the principal
due with respect to those mortgages exceeded the principal of the pass-
through certificates they secured.85
As explained in the following section, generally accepted accounting
principles required GTF to treat these securitization transactions as "sales" of
the underlying mortgages on which GTF recognized gain equal to the present
value of the excess cash flows it expected to receive. Such "sales" were the
source of most of GTF's reported income. GTF's reported income from the
securitization of loans was $671 million in 1995 and $941 million in 1996,86
these certificates. GTF had bank letter of credit and surety bonds outstanding of $140,972,000 and
$156,617,000 at December 31, 1996 and 1995, respectively. Id.
83. See id. GTF issued 77.6% of all manufactured housing securities in 1995 and 85% in 1994.
See Michael Millman, Green Tree: Good Start for 1996; Stock Strong Buy, First Call Notes (Lehman
Bros.), Jan. 25, 1996. For the period 1986 through June 30, 1996, GTF had completed in excess of 100
deals. See Paul A. Mackey, DWR Raises Green Tree 1997 EPS Estimate & Target Price: Reiterates
Buy, First Call Notes (Dean Witter), Sept. 27, 1996. GTF's investors include banks, insurance
companies, bond funds and pension funds. See id.
84. GTF also remained obligated to service the loans, for which it received a servicing fee.
85. The fact that GTF's borrowers were less likely to refinance than borrowers with conventional
mortgages greatly increased the value of the rights GTF retained. See Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex.
Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1022 (4th Cir. 1997):
Historically, investments in fixed-rate home mortgages have not been attractive to institutional
investors. Investors in most fixed-rate securities benefit when interest rates fall. The fixed-rate
security then earns interest at a rate higher than decreased prevailing rates. However, unlike other
fixed- rate investments such as U.S. treasuries, fixed-rate home mortgages do not benefit from
declines in interest rates. Because home mortgages may be freely prepaid, home owners
frequently refinance their homes to take advantage of a drop in interest rates. When the mortgage
is prepaid, the investor's funds are returned. If the investor seeks to reinvest those funds, as would
be the case with most institutional investors, they must be reinvested at the low prevailing rate,
rather than earning interest at the higher rate of the original mortgage. This is called the
"prepayment risk" If interest rates rise, home mortgages are generally not refinanced, and they
lose value just like any other fixed-rate security. Thus, investments in home mortgages perform
poorly both when interest rates rise and when they fall.
Id.
86. See 1996 GTE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 16 (before provision for losses which
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amounts equal to more than 63% of GTF's net income in each of those
years.
87
GTF also raised additional cash (but did not generate additional income)
from another kind of securitization transaction. GTF sold $600 million in
"Securitized Net Interest Margin Certificates" ("NIMs") in 1994 and $308
million in NIMs in 1995.88 The NIMs were secured by GTF's pledge of its
rights to the excess cash flows that would be generated by the mortgages
securing pass-through certificates that GTF previously had sold.89 In each of
these NIMs offerings, GTF itself purchased a subordinated tranche with a
face value equal to about 25% of the value of the entire offering. GTF was
not entitled to receive any payments with respect to these subordinated NIMs
until all payments of principal and interest had been made with respect to the
NIMs purchased by others. As of December 31, 1996, GTF held
subordinated NIMs with a book value of $322 million.90
B. GTF's Accounting Conventions
In accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, GTF used
what is referred to as "gain on sale accounting." 91 When GTF sold a pool of
loans in a securitization, it recorded its "net gain on contract sales" as income
were $351.7 million and $223.0 million in 1996 and 1995, respectively).
87. Net of provisions for losses. In contrast, servicing fee income, net of related expenses,
represented less than 8% of GTF's income in 1995 and 1996. See id. at 11.
88. See id. at 13.
89. These deals were collateralized by "excess cash flow on [GTF] deals, which is essentially the
difference between the interest rate on the manufactured housing loans and the coupon rate on the
[NIMs], ranging from a low of 2.86% on deals issued prior to 1986 to a high of 5.78% on a deal issued
in 1992. This money, less servicing fees on the deals, would normally revert to [GTF] periodically."
Am. Banker, Inc., GreenTree to Securitize Excess Spread from Manufactured Housing ABS, 8 ASSET
SALES REP. 4 (Jan. 31, 1994), available in 1994 WL 3765799. See infra notes 91-96 and
accompanying text for a discussion of excess servicing rights receivable.
90. See 1996 GTF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 21. GTF disclosed that the $322 million
-is analyzed quarterly to determine the impact, if any, of adverse prepayment or loss experience [but]
will continue to reflect the discount rates utilized at the time of sale." Id. at 22.
91. See generally, ACCOUNTING FOR CERTAIN MORTGAGE BANKING ACTIVITIES, STATEMENT
OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 65 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1982)
[hereinafter ACCOUNTING FOR CERTAIN MORTGAGE BANKING ACTIVITIES]. In June, 1996, the
Financial Accounting Standards Board issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 125
(SFAS No. 125), effective for transactions occurring subsequent to December 31, 1996, which
amended SFAS No. 65. While gain on sale accounting continues to be the proper accounting method,
SFAS No. 125 requires that the interest only portion of excess servicing rights receivable (the amount
"that can contractually be prepaid or otherwise settled in such a way that the holder would not recover
substantially all of its recorded investment") be classified as "available for sale or trading" and
thereafter measured at fair value, with adjustments through equity. ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND
SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS OF LIABILITIES, STATEMENT OF
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 125 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1996).
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and an "excess servicing rights receivable" as an asset. GTF described the
"net gain on contract sales" as an "amount equal to the present value of the
expected excess servicing rights receivable to be collected during the term of
the [loans], plus or minus any premiums or discounts realized on the sale of
the [loans] and less any selling expenses."92 It described the "excess
servicing rights receivable" as "the cash expected to be received... over the
life of the [loans] discounted to present value." 93
To calculate "net gain on contract sales," first GTF would total up the
amounts due to be paid by the borrowers whose mortgages it had "sold."
94
Then it would deduct from this total (i) the amounts it was required to pay to
the holders of the pass-through certificates secured by those mortgages; (ii)
estimated amounts that borrowers would not remit as a result of
prepayments, delinquencies and defaults; (iii) FHA and other fees it was
required to remit on behalf of the mortgagees; and (iv) the servicing fees it
was entitled to receive.95 Finally, GTF would calculate and record as income
the present value of the remaining balance. As noted above, such gains on
sales comprised more than 63% of GTF's reported income in both 1995 and
1996.96
Gain on sale accounting has its critics.9 7 By its very nature, gain on sale is
an estimate, a best guess of what will occur.98 GTF could not value its excess
cash flows with precision. They would fluctuate as a result of prepayments
92. 1996 GTF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 10.
93. Id.
94. These payments include principal and interest, F-IA insurance and other credit enhancement
fees.
95. See 1996 GTF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74. Statement of Accounting Standard No. 65
provides that where a loan is sold and servicing retained, a portion of the sales price represents
deferred income to the extent the stated servicing fee rate differs from the current (normal) servicing
fee rate. The deferred amounts are amortized into income over future periods, as they are earned. See
ACCOUNTING FOR CERTAIN MORTGAGE BANKING ACTIVITIES, supra note 91, at para. 11 (Financial
Accounting Standards Bd. 1982).
96. This total included gains on sales of other kinds of loans as well, such as home improvement
loans. However, originating, servicing and selling manufactured housing mortgages comprised by far
the largest portion of GTF's business.
97. Gain on sale accounting also allows a company to "manage" its earnings to some degree,
especially since a company can exercise considerable control over how many loans it "sells" in any
given period and how many it retains. As one analyst noted: "Through innovative loan syndications,
[GTF] front-ends profits by recognizing the present value difference between the interest rate it
charges customers and the interest rate it pays investors, less provisions for losses and prepayments."
Mackey, supra note 75.
98. However, this estimate does not fall within the safe harbor the Reform Act created for
"forward looking statements" because it is "included in a financial statement prepared in accordance
with generally accepted accounting principles. "See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 78u-5(b)(2)(A) (Supp. I 1996).
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and defaults, both of which would reduce gain on sale.99 Consequently,
GTF's reported gains on sales were only as reliable as the assumptions it
used to calculate those gains.
GTF disclosed in its financial statements that it used discount rates of
9.4% in 1995 and 9.2% in 1996 to calculate the present value of the excess
payments it expected to receive.1°° However, GTF did not disclose, in its
financials or elsewhere, the assumptions concerning prepayments and
defaults that it used to calculate gains on sales.
GTF did make the following public statements concerning its
assumptions:
* That in calculating gain on sale, it used assumptions
concerning prepayments, defaults, and interest rates which
it "believes market participants would use."''
* That "[t]he Company believes that the excess servicing
rights receivable recognized at the time of sale does not
exceed the amount that would be received if it were sold in
the marketplace."'
02
* That it "analyzed [the value of its excess servicing rights
receivables] quarterly to determine the impact of
prepayments, if any."'
10 3
* That it had "developed its assumptions based on experience
with its own portfolio, available market data (including
market estimates utilized in the sales of the NIM
Certificates) and ongoing consultation with its investment
bankers" and that these assumptions "are similar to those
which would be used by an outside investor."'
'1 4
99. A default obviously would reduce the cash received by GTF if the property securing a
mortgage was worth less than the principal outstanding. Prepayments, whether due to defaults,
refinancings or other causes, also would reduced GTF's gain on sale by reducing the period during
which GTF would receive payments of interest at rates higher than the interest GTF was obliged to pay
on the pass-through certificates. See supra note 172.
100. See 1996 GTF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 20.
101. Id. at9.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 22. This represents 44% and 32% of GTF's total assets at December 31, 1996 and
1995, respectively. See id. at September 30, 1997, excess servicing rights were reclassified, as a result
of GTF's application of SFAS No. 125 (see supra note 91), into two components: servicing rights of
$42.8 million (1% of total assets) and interest only securities of $1.208 billion (32% of total assets).
See GTF SEPT. 30, 1997 QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 73.
104. 1996 GTF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 20.
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GTF did not report any gain (or loss) on the NIMs transactions because,
for accounting purposes, all they involved was GTF swapping excess
servicing rights receivables for cash and NIMs of equal value. These
transactions also removed from GTF's books the excess servicing rights
receivables that served as collateral for the NIMs. However, the value of the
subordinated interest in the NIMs that GTF retained depended on the value
of those excess servicing rights receivables. As noted above, as of the end of
1996, GTF reported the value of the subordinated NIMs to be $318 million,
an amount that GTF stated it had "calculated using prepayment and default
assumptions which the Company believes market participants would use
currently."' 5 GTF did not disclose any other information about those
prepayment and default assumptions.
C. GTFs Statements Concerning its Income for 1996 and 1997
In its annual report for the year ending December 31, 1996, GTF reported
net income of $308.7 million ($2.20 per share), up 22% from $253.9 million
($1.81 per share) in 1995.106 In his letter to shareholders, Mr. Coss observed:
"This represents our sixth consecutive year of record earnings, a notable
achievement considering the volatile interest rate patterns and changing
competitive forces that have prevailed during that period. , 0 7 As concerned
analysts' estimates that GTF would earn $3.00 per share for 1997 (a 37%
increase over 1996), Mr. Coss stated: "We think that's an achievable number.
We're comfortable with that."'
08
GTF did report increased earnings for the first three quarters of 1997. On
April 17, 1997, it issued a press release announcing first quarter earnings of
$0.65 per share, an increase of 35% from the first quarter of 1996.109 On July
17, 1997, it announced second quarter earnings of $0.78 per share, a 44%
increase from the second quarter of 1996. t0 On October 15, 1997, it
announced third quarter earnings of $0.85 per share, a 39% increase from the
105. Id. at28.
106. See id. at 16. In 1994, GTF reported net income of $181.2 million ($1.31 per share). See id.
107. Id. at President's Letter (emphasis added).
108. Reuters, Ltd., Green Tree: Says $3/EPS in 1997 Achievable, REUTERS FIN. $ERVS., May 16,
1997.
109. See Green Tree Financial Announces 35 Percent Increase in First Quarter Earnings to a
Record $.65 Per Share, Press Release, Apr. 17, 1997 (noting that the quarter's earnings exceeded
expectations despite implementation of SAFS No. 125 which resulted in a $0.03 per share charge to
earnings and a $9 million reduction in equity).
110. See Green Tree Financial Announces Record Second Quarter Earnings Per Share of $.78;
Declares Increased Cash Dividend, Press Release, July 17, 1997.
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third quarter of 1996, a "third straight quarter of record earnings."' n
Not quite one month later, on November 13, 1997, GTF issued the press
release in which it announced that it would make an addition to reserves in
the fourth quarter of 1997 of $125 to $150 million. GTF stated that it would
take this action "primarily to accommodate a reduction in the carrying value
of certain interest only securities, specifically the subordinated interests in
[the NIMs], in response to higher prepayment assumptions for certain pools
of manufactured housing loans."'"12 The addition to reserves would have
reduced GTF's earnings by $0.57 to $0.68 per share.' 13 That day, GTF's
stock closed at $32.75, down 18.9% from the previous day's close of
$40.375. 114
On November 14, 1997, GTF filed its Form 10-Q for the third quarter of
1997, which provided additional information about the proposed increase in
reserves:
The Company, along with other financial services companies, has
experienced higher prepayment activity in its portfolio, particularly
with respect to manufactured housing loans made in the higher interest
rate environment of 1994 and 1995. Since the end of the third quarter
of 1997, the company has undertaken a special review ofprepayment
rates for such loans and the assumptions utilized in its models to
compute the value of its interest only securities. Preliminarily, the
Company has determined that a write down of the value of its interest
only securities in an amount estimated to be in the range of $125 to
$150 million will be made for the quarter ended December 31, 1997.
Depending on the final results of the review, the actual valuation
adjustment may be greater or less than his amount. The valuation
adjustment will result in a fourth quarter pre-tax reduction to earnings
equal to the amount of the adjustment. The Company has also
instituted programs to reduce the number of prepayments and loss
severity, and the Company's management will monitor the effect of
these programs in connection with its quarterly review of the valuation
of its interest only securities."
The wording of GTF's press release and Form 10-Q implies that GTF
111. Green Tree Financial Posts Record Third Quarter Earnings; Managed Receivables Reach
$26 Billion, Press Release, Oct. 15, 1997.
112. Press Release, supra note 31.
113. Net of taxes, assuming GTF had 136 million shares outstanding. See GTF SEPT. 30, 1997
QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 73.
114. See WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1997, at C4.
115. GTF SEPT. 30, 1997 QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 73 (emphasis added).
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based its proposed addition to reserves on newly available information. Had,
that been the case, it probably would have been appropriate for GTF to
reflect that information in a "change of estimate" that reduced its earnings for
the fourth quarter of 1997.
Accounting literature acknowledges that "preparing financial statements
requires estimating the effects of future events [that] cannot be perceived
with certainty."' 6 Estimates can change "as new events occur, as more
experience is acquired, or as additional information is obtained."' 17 A change
in estimate "results from new information or subsequent developments and
accordingly from better insight or improved judgment." ' Generally
accepted accounting principles require a company to account for the effect of
a change in accounting estimate in the period the change is made and in
future periods. 19 Restatement of prior periods is not allowed. 20
Generally accepted accounting principles draw a sharp distinction
between a change of estimate and an accounting error, 121 which the literature
defines as the "result [of] mathematical mistakes, mistakes in the application
of accounting principles, or oversight or misuse offacts that existed at the
time the financial statements were prepared."'122 A company is required to
account for an error by restating its income for prior periods.
23
The key question posed by GTF's November 1997 statements was
whether the information that led GTF to announce its proposed addition to
reserves had just become available, or whether GTF had known or recklessly
disregarded that (and, perhaps, additional similar information) when it issued
its financial statements for 1996 and the first three quarters of 1997. If the
latter was the case, a strong claim could be made that GTF had issued those
financial statements in violation of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. The
essence of such a claim would be that GTF had overestimated and then
overstated its gain on sale. Additionally, the claim would specify that GTF
did the same with respect to the value of its excess servicing rights
receivables and its subordinated interest in the NIMs. A plaintiff would argue
that GTF achieved this by using assumptions concerning prepayments and
116. ACCOUNTING CHANGES, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BULLETIN OPINION NO. 20, para. 10
(July, 1971).
117. Id.
118. Id., para. 13.
119. Seeid.,para. 31.
120. See id.
121. See id., para. 36.
122. Id., para. 13 (emphasis added).
123. See id., para. 36 (as provided for in REPORTING THE RESULTS OF OPERATIONS, ACCOUNTING
PRINCIPLES BULLETIN OPINION NO. 9, para. 18 (Dec. 1966)).
[VOL. 76:457
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss2/2
1998] PROCEDURAL CATCH-22 OF THE PSLRA
defaults that were considerably more aggressive than the assumptions a
"market participant" would have used. 24
D. Facts that Suggest GTF's 1996 Annual and 1997 Quarterly Financial
Statements Were Materially False or Misleading
There were two ways in which a plaintiff could attempt to show that
GTF's assumptions concerning prepayments were unreasonable: by
comparing them to GTF's actual experience with prepayments, or by
pointing to information concerning the market for manufactured housing
loans that indicated a strong likelihood prepayments would accelerate.
During the period prior to January 28, 1998, GTF did not make public data
concerning its actual prepayment experience and we did not find such data
available through any other source.125 Consequently, we focused our inquiry
on the market for manufactured housing loans. We found a great deal of
information that indicated (i) significant changes in competitive and
economic conditions had occurred in that market prior to the end of 1996; (ii)
GTF knew about those changes; and (iii) it would have been at least reckless
for GTF not to alter its prepayment assumptions to reflect those changes.
126
1. Increased Competition
Mr. Coss founded GTF in 1975 to originate loans for mobile homes and
124. Much of our inquiry focused on GTF's assumptions concerning prepayments because GTF
identified increased prepayments as the reason for its change of estimate. We also looked for
information suggesting that GTF experienced a significant increase in losses due to defaults.
Although GTE announced in November 1997 that it was increasing the discount rate it used to
calculate the present value of excess servicing rights receivables, see M. Huges, Green Tree: Lowering
Rating Based on Charge, First Call Notes (Merrill Lynch), Nov. 14, 1997, GTF had disclosed the
discount rate it used to calculate that value in previous years. We did not believe that a plaintiff could
reasonably claim that it was fraudulent for GTF to use a discount rate that was lower than the rate a
market participant would have used, so long as GTF disclosed the rate it was using.
GTF's announcement on January 27, 1998 that information about prepayments would lead it to
restate its 1996 financial statements to reduce by $200 million the carrying value of its "interest only
securities," see Press Release, supra note 31, amounted to an acknowledgment that GTF ignored or
misused information about prepayments that was in existence at the time GTF prepared those financial
statements. That announcement presumably shifted the focus of the plaintiffs' claims from whether
such information existed but had been ignored by GTF to whether GTF's error was deliberate, reckless
or merely negligent. We assume that plaintiffs' pursuing securities fraud claims against GTF also will
question whether the amount of the restatement was correct, or whether it should have been larger it to
take account of the information that led GTF to also add $190 million (up from $125 to $150 million)
to reserves in the fourth quarter of 1997. See id.
125. Such as government reports.
126. We limited our research to published materials. Attorneys for real plaintiffs, of course, also
have the option of hiring investigators with a view to obtaining information from a potential
defendant's employees, former employees, customers and competitors.
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RVs, a sub-prime market that few established lenders sought to serve.
Financing opportunities created by fallout from the savings and loan crisis
helped GTF to experience rapid growth in the 1980s. t27 A more important
factor that contributed to GTF's expansion was the steady growth of the
manufactured housing industry. Mobile homes now represent approximately
7% of U.S. housing stock and account for about one quarter of new housing
starts. t2 8 The quality of mobile homes also has improved. 129 This has
attracted more buyers; approximately 45% of first-time home buyers
purchase mobile homes.13' As a result, traditional lenders who had
previously steered clear of manufactured housing began entering the market,
including such "banking giants" as NationsBank Corp., First Union Corp.,
and Barnett Banks, Inc.
13 1
As more lenders began offering manufactured-housing loans, competition
increased.132 A 1996 article in American Banker noted that manufactured
housing was a "tough market" because "[t]here are so many new players.
Even though the market is growing by 10%, the number of players is
growing faster."'133 To attract new customers, lenders found it necessary to
offer lower interest rates and to loosen underwriting guidelines by offering
low down payment loans to borrowers with poor credit records.1
34
This increase in competition had direct implications for GTF and for the
assumptions it was making concerning prepayment of outstanding loans.
127. See HOOVER'S COMPANY PROFILE, GREEN TREE FIN. (1998).
128. See Steven Davidson, Financing ManufacturedHousing, AM. COMMUNITY BANKER, Nov. 1,
1997, at 38. For the first seven months of 1997, manufactured housing was 24% of single family
housing starts and 29% of all new single-family houses sold. See id. A decade ago, manufactured
housing was less than 3% of all housing stock. See Mackey, supra note 75.
129. "Manufactured housing is beginning to take on more of the look and feel of permanent
construction than that of a mobile home." Davidson, supra note 128, at 38.
130. See id.
131. Christina Binkley, Mortgage Lenders Pursue Once-Shunned Borrowers, WALL. ST. J., Sept.
11, 1996 (noting that some lenders are offering 30-year mortgages on mobile homes). Other new
players during 1996 and 1997 included: CWM Mortgage Holdings, Cargill, Inc., Resource Mortgage
Capital Corp., Alliance Funding, Chase Manhattan Corp., and KeyCorp. See John Bancroft, In the
News, REAL ESTATE FIN. TODAY, Feb. 14, 1997, at 1; Edward Kulkowsky, Pipeline: Resource
Mortgage Capital Exemplifies 1996 Revival in the Mortgage Business, AM. BANKER, Dec. 11, 1996, at
12; Heather Timmons, Barnett Hiring May Signal Prefab-Home Effort, AM. BANKER, May 22, 1997;
BankAmerica Puts a For-Sale Sign on Prefab-Home Lending Division, AM. BANKER, Oct. 16, 1997, at
I.
132. See Becky Froass, A Definition of Terms, MORTGAGE BANKING, June 1, 1997, at 99 (noting
that the market share of the top 25 sub-prime lenders fell to 42.1% from 59.1% in 1996 as mortgage
banks, mortgage brokers, and commercial banks and thrifts competed for borrowers with "non-
conforming" credit).
133. Heather Timmons, Cargill Merges Subprime, Manufactured Housing Units, AM. BANKER,
Apr. 25, 1996, at 11.
134. See Davidson, supra note 128, at 38 (noting that increased delinquencies have accompanied
the "greater credit availability").
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First, the increased quality of manufactured housing was attracting more
creditworthy purchasers. More financing institutions were competing for
their business, reducing the spread between manufactured housing and
conventional mortgage loans. Reduced spreads, more sophisticated
borrowers, and a decline in interest rates from a secular peak in 1994 all
made it more likely that borrowers would refinance their mortgages, which
would increase prepayments.' 35 In addition, because GTF also was
responding to increased competition by making loans to less creditworthy
borrowers and at higher loan-to-value ratios, prepayments as a result of
defaults also were likely to increase, making historical loss experiences a less
reliable indicator of future performance.1
36
Outside observers clearly anticipated that GTF's prepayments and
delinquencies would increase as a result of these developments. In early
1996, Lehman Brothers noted that GTF was "aggressively target[ing] better
credit, including borrowers of more expensive homes with placement on
private lots and homes with longer lives. In addition, it was also targeting
those with higher LTVs (95%)."'137 Lehman Brothers suggested that
prepayments appeared "faster than anticipated, perhaps because of better
credit quality of borrowers with higher balances who are more sensitive to
interest rate changes."'
38
During the first quarter of 1997, Standard & Poor's decided to include
manufactured housing securities in its "convexity stress test" applicable to
bonds deemed to have "higher prepayment risk of negative convexity.' 39
Moody's Investor Services predicted that manufacturing housing
securitization would reach $10 billion in new issuances in 1997, "a record
total that brings with it new players and possibly higher loan default rates"
since many of the pools previously issued were "hitting their peak loss
135. See S&P Says Competition is Cause for Concern for Some Lenders, NAT'L MORTGAGE
NEws, Dec. 22, 1997, at 20 (citing David Graifman, associate director of S&P's rating group: "To
think that prepayment speeds are going to be consistent when you have so many new companies
jumping in is not a good premise to base your assets on.").
136. See Am. Banker, Inc., See Market Debates Manny Health, 11 ASSET SALES REPORT (Oct. 27,
1997), available in 1997 WL 14227044 (noting that loans were being made to borrowers who "might
not otherwise have gotten that credit had there only been a handful of lenders"; that there has been a
"steady loan-to-value creep"; and that manufactured housing lenders are operating in a "high-default
environment").
137. Millman, supra note 83 (noting that GTF was now targeting borrowers with loan to value
(LTV) ratios of 95%).
138. Id.
139. Am. Banker, Inc., DIJ Urges Some HEL Caution, 11 ASSET SALES REP. (Jan. 20, 1997),
available in 1997 WL 7897901 (noting that higher prepayments in 1996 for manufactured housing
were "widely anticipated").
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periods.'
4 0
GTF's own actions and statements indicate that it also was aware of the
changing competitive climate for manufactured housing loans. In 1993, when
manufactured housing loans represented 92% of GTF's loan originations,
GTF began to diversify.' 4 ' By the first half of 1997, manufactured housing
represented only 38% of GTF's $10.6 billion loan origination volume, while
commercial financing accounted for 27%.142 In his 1996 letter to
shareholders, Mr. Coss observed: "The diversification strategy that Green
Tree implemented many years ago has been the single most important
element in generating a stable operating profile for the Company."'
43
2. Prepayment Rates
The rate at which the mortgages underlying pass-through certificates are
likely to be prepaid affects investors' calculations of the period during which
their principal will be outstanding and the rate of interest they should
receive. 44 Until the early 1990s, GTF's manufactured housing certificates
reflected "stability of prepayment rates" because
[b]orrowers [were] not as sensitive to changes in interest rates and thus
[did] not refinance as readily [since] their loan balance [was] typically
small [and] depreciation of a manufactured home often exceed[ed]
amortization in the early years of a loan, meaning that a borrower
140. Manufactured Housing Market Should Hit Record in 1997, 12 MORTGAGE-BACKED SEC.
LETTER (Mar 3, 1997), available in 1997 WL 8651619 (noting that lenders will be tempted to offer
promotions such as 5% down payment programs to increase market share).
141. See GREEN TREE FIN. CORP., 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1994).
142. See Alan R. Elliott, Companies in the News: Green Tree is Financing More Than
Manufactured Housing, INV. BUS. DAILY, Aug. 21, 1997, at B14 (noting that increase in
commercial lending was largely a result of GTF's acquisition of the sales-finance division (equipment
leasing services to manufacturers and dealers) of Finova Group, Inc., in 1996).
143. 1996 GTF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at President's Letter (emphasis added).
144. The court for the Southern District of New York stated:
CMOs are derivative securities that represent distinct interests in the cash flow generated by an
underlying collateral pool of residential mortgages. The cash flow generated by this pool is
derived from two sources: (i) repayment of principal; and (ii) interest payments. Consequently, the
value of a particular CMO depends upon the extent to which the instrument is entitled to share in
the proceeds of the cash flow. For example, CMOs entitling the holder to principal payments are
especially valuable in times of declining interest rates, since holders of the underlying mortgages
are likely to refinance their existing mortgages to avail themselves of the lower rates, thereby
increasing principal prepayments. Conversely, CMOs linked to interest payments typically
increase in value during times of rising interest rates, since mortgage holders are less likely to
refinance, thereby decreasing principal prepayments and increasing interest payments.
Primavera Familienstiftung v. Askin, Nos. 95 CIV.8905 (RWS), 97 CIV.1856 (RWS), 1998 WL
128823, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1998).
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would have to put up more equity to refinance .... 45
a. Prepayment Models Used by GTF's Underwriters
Prior to 1994, GTF's underwriters priced GTF pass-through certificates
they sold using the PSA model, which used HUD and FHA data to estimate
the rate at which conventional mortgages would be prepaid. 146 In 1994, GTF
and Lehman Brothers introduced "a new pricing method for manufactured
housing deals called the MHP [Manufactured Housing Prepayment]
Curve." 147 The MHP curve "essentially assume[d] lower prepayment speeds
over the life of the deal and longer average lives on the securities issued
[which allowed GTF to] assume greater excess cash flow in the deal."'148 In
other words, the MHP curve reflected GTF's experience in a market
characterized by unsophisticated borrowers and limited competition,
characteristics that were changing at the time the MHP curve was introduced.
Through early 1995, Lehman priced GTF's manufactured housing
transactions at 100% of the MHP Curve.' 49 In June, 1995, pricing speeds
were increased to 125% MHP to "address investor concerns. 150 GTF's chief
financial officer, John Brink, noted at the time that "[p]repayments are still
not the factor that they are in site-built housing, but with the decline in
interest rates there has been some increase in prepayments."'' In July, 1995,
however, a GTF deal was again priced at 100% MHP because, according to
Brink, "the underlying pool of loans were not under prepayment pressure, or
145. Investment Dealers' Dig., Inc., Lehman Devises Default Model for Mobile Home Loans, 7
MORTGAGE-BACKED SEC. LETTER (May 4, 1992), available in 1992 WL 2746475 (noting that
Lehman Brothers had "constructed a default model for manufactured housing securities" based on
GTF's experience). See also Investment Dealers' Dig., Inc., First Boston Develops Prepayment Model
for Manufactured Housing, 7 MORTGAGE-BACKED SEC. LETTER (May 25, 1992), available in 1992
WL 2746441 (noting that First Boston had also developed a prepayment model for manufactured
housing loans "in cooperation with" GTF and concluding that prepayment rates were "much less
sensitive to interest rate movements" and "resemble[d] the PSA standard prepayment model, rising
steadily for 30 months and then leveling off' while "[d]efaults and losses [were] closely associated
with the degree of homeowner equity in the property").
146. See FRANK J. FABOZZI, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES: NEW STRATEGIES, APPLICATIONS
AND RESEARCH 377-78 (1987).
147. Am. Banker, Inc., Green Tree to Securitize Excess Spread from Manufactured Housing ABS,
8 ASSET SALES REP. (Jan. 31, 1994).
148. Id. The MHP Curve assumed that prepayments start at around 3% (rather than PSA levels of
zero) and quickly level off at 6% in month 24 (whereas the PSA leveled off in month 30 at higher
rates). Id.
149. See Am. Banker, Inc., Green Tree Issues 1st Non-Investment Grade Public Asset-Backed
Security, 7 ASSET SALE REP. (Dec. 20, 1993), available in WL 5862567.
150. Am. Banker, Inc., Green Tree Ups Pricing Speed, 9 ASSET SALES REP. (June 19, 1995),
available in 1995 WL 6919277.
151. Id.
19981
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'in the money,' because the issuer lowered its financing rates by 50 basis
points since its last manufactured housing deal.' 52
In January 1996, Lehman again increased pricing speeds to 125% MHP
as a result of increasing manufactured housing prepayments."t 3 Lehman
officials noted that GTF's "current coupon prepayments are faster than
anticipated"' 54 and also stated that they "generally believe that the rise in
current coupon prepayments [resulted] from the improvement in the
borrower base for manufactured housing." 155 Lehman observed that GTF
would need "to take [the increased prepayments] into account when
calculating their excess servicing spread which would likely result in a
reduction [in its] gain on securitization [which] could be lower than in the
past for comparable spreads."'5 6 GTF, however, remained optimistic about
its 1996 earnings and stated that it expected "little impact from new
competition, below market industry delinquencies, a catch-up in spreads, and
the impact of new lending programs."'
57
From January to August of 1996, manufactured housing pass-through
certificates issued by GTF continued to be priced at 125% MHP.158
However, in December, 1996, a portfolio securitized by GTF for which
Merrill Lynch was the lead underwriter was priced at 150% MHP.' 59 In early
1997, Lehman Brothers revised its pricing model for securitizations to reflect
152. Am. Banker, Inc., Issuance Rebounds to $1.85 Billion for the Week, 9 ASSET SALES REP.
(July 17, 1995), available in 1995 WL 6919361.
153. See Am. Banker, Inc., ABS Spreads Tighter Despite Selling, 10 ASSET SALES REP. (Jan. 29,
1996), available in 1996 WL 5617457.
154. Millman, supra note 83.
155. ABS Spreads Tighter Despite Selling, supra note 153.
156. Millman, supra note 83.
157. L. Asher, Green Tree Financial: Keeps Doing It, First Call Notes (Merrill Lynch), Apr. 17,
1996.
158. See, e.g., Investment Dealers' Dig., Inc., Observations: Merrill Structures Manufactured
Housing Deal, I 1 MORTGAGE-BACKED SEC. LETTER (June 24, 1996), available in 1996 WL 8090857
(GTF's 1996-5 deal priced at 125%); Investment Dealers' Dig., Inc., Lehman Guides Green Tree Deal,
11 MORTGAGE-BACKED SEC. LETTER (July 29, 1996), available in 1996 WL 8090941 (noting a report
issued by Merrill Lynch which found that GTF's "deals have shown a considerable increase in
prepayments during the past two or three months [but] expecting slower short-term prepayments going
forward due to the current interest rate and economic environment"). See also Investment Dealers'
Dig., Inc., Associates Launches Largest-Ever Manufactured Housing Deal, I 1 MORTGAGE-BACKED
SEC. LETTER (Sept. 30, 1996), available in 1996 WL 13554357 (disclosing that Associates Corp. of
North America securitized the "largest-ever" manufactured housing portfolio of $920 million in
September, 1996, utilizing prepayment speeds of 150% MHP); Investment Dealers' Dig., Inc.,
Prudential Guides UCFC MH Transaction, 12 MORTGAGE-BACKED SEC. LETTER (June 23, 1997),
available in 1997 WL 8651980 (noting that Prudential Securities, Inc., priced its third manufactured
housing portfolio assuming a 175% MHP prepayment rate).
159. See New Securities Issues, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 10, 1996, at C24. See also Am. Banker, Inc.,
Whispers, 10 ASSET SALES REP. (Dec. 16, 1996), available in 1996 WL 13975202 (noting that GTF
changed its prepayment speeds "due to higher delinquencies and losses" from 135% to 150%).
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prepayments of 175% MHP.160 In late March 1997, Lehman Brothers
disclosed that due to "increasing 'housing turnover' and 'refinancing
opportunities,' it had once again revised its expected pricing model for
GTF's manufactured housing loan securitizations" to reflect prepayments of
185% MHP.
161
The fact that GTF's two lead underwriters were continually increasing
pricing speeds on the manufactured housing loans securitized during 1996
and 1997 strongly suggests that, beginning in 1996, GTF should have revised
the assumptions it used to calculate gain on the sale of manufactured housing
loans. GTF's optimistic comments suggest that GTF did not take such action.
b. Analyst's Estimates of Prepayments
Analysts at Oppenheimer & Co. compiled actual prepayment data on
thirty pools of manufactured housing loans securing pass-through certificates
pools issued by GTF and found that there were "noticeable increases in
prepayment speeds for late 1994 and mid-1995," while the late-1995 and
1996 pools reflected slower prepayment rates.1 62 GTF's underwriters had
used prepayment assumptions of 150% MHP when pricing these deals.
163
When the analysts calculated actual prepayment rates for these pools, they
discovered that some were experiencing significantly higher prepayments. 164
They explained: "Simply put, the manufactured housing lending industry has
become more competitive, with the result that prepayments speeds have
increased."'165 The pools experiencing the highest prepayment speeds were
those pools in which the loans had the highest weighted average coupons.'66
The analysts noted in their report that "[o]ur analysis is not an intellectual
exercise [and] has important ramifications for Green Tree's margins and
earmings.
167
160. See Jacob M. Schlesinger, Treasury Increases Second Offering of Popular Securities Indexed
to Protect Against Inflation, WALL. ST. J., Apr. 3, 1997, at C20.
161. Id.
162. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., Green Tree Financial: Trimming Estimates Because of Decline in
Gain-on-Sale Margin (Oct. 20, 1997). The report credits Steven Eisman and Vincent Daniel. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id. For example, 1994-7, 1995-2 and 1995-5 had experienced prepayments of 13.7%,
15.8% and 13.7%, respectively, in the 24th month while 9.0% was anticipated by a 150% MHP
prepayment speed. See id.
165. Id. (noting that contributing factors included the increasing quality of homes (more multiwide
units attached to land) and borrowers (more able and more likely to refinance)).
166. See id. Pool 1994-7 had a weighted average coupon ("WAC') of 11.4% and Pool 1995-2's
WAC was 12.0%. In contrast, 1996 pools had WAC's of 9.9% to 10.5%. See id.
167. Id.
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3. 1996 NIM Credit Enhancement
When GTF sold NIMs in 1994 and 1995, the accompanying prospectuses
cautioned that given "the complexity of analyzing the credit risks," the NIMs
were an "appropriate investment only for persons familiar with manufactured
housing contract performance and asset-backed security structures."
' 68
GTF advised investors that unlike standard corporate bonds, the
timing and amount of principal payments on the certificates is not
fixed and will be determined by the timing and amount of cash flows
in the trust property, which in turn will be dependent on the rate of
prepayments and by the timing and amount of delinquencies and
losses realized on the contracts.
169
GTF further cautioned that "if the contracts experience extreme prepayment
rates, certificate holders may experience a reduction in yield or fail to recoup
fully their initial investments."'
170
In October, 1996, GTF announced that it would "enhance" the return on
about one-half of the NIMs because the performance of the excess servicing
rights receivables that served as collateral was "somewhat different than
assumed."'171 According to Lehman Brothers, faster prepayments and higher
defaults resulted in less than anticipated excess interest.
7 2
GTF said it would add "25 basis points of [its] servicing fee to the net
interest margin cash flow each month.' 17" In effect, GTF agreed to add
approximately $10 million in cash to the NIMs in the first year (and less in
later years) to "bring the average life back to the originally anticipated
level." 74 An article in a trade newsletter observed:
168. GREEN TREE FIN. CORP., PROSPECTuS. Green Tree Securitized Net Interest Margin Trusts
1994-A, 1994-B and 1995-A (each noting in a section of the Prospectus entitled "Yield, Average Life
and Prepayment Considerations" that these factors (the "two primary factors are defaults and voluntary
prepayments") "may affect the amounts and timing of the distributions on the trust property"). Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Michael Millman, Green Tree: No Stock Concern from Enhancement ofResidual Securities,
First Call Notes (Lehman Bros.), Oct. 14, 1996.
172. See Am. Banker, Inc., Green Tree Adds Juice, 10 ASSET SALES REP. (Oct 7, 1996), available
in 1996 WL 5618253, quoting a Lehman analyst who explained that:
A prepayment means there is no more interest payment from that loan, which results in less cash
being available to pay interest and principal on the [NIMs]. A default also results in a loss of
future interest payments .... A rise in prepayments or defaults will generally tend to extend the
average life of the [NIMs] as there is less monthly cash flow available to pay down the principal
of the [NIMs].
173. Id.
174. Millman, supra note 171 (reducing the average life from three years to two years).
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Green Tree's action demonstrate that defaults and prepayments in its
manufactured housing loan portfolio had become unmanageable for
the net interest margin deals, which are essentially interest-only "strip"
securities created from cash flow left over after bondholders from
other deals have been paid.
175
GTF's enhancement of the NIMs suggests that GTF may have overstated
the fair value of its 25% subordinated interest in the NIMs at the end of 1996.
GTF did state that the carrying value of its interest in the NIMs exceeded
their fair value by $13 million at December 31, 1996.176 However, the
enhancement suggests that there may have been a risk of default on NIMs
sold to other investors, in which event it seems unlikely that the subordinated
NIMs had a fair value of $309 million. 177
The enhancement of the NIMs also indicates that GTF's management was
aware in October 1996 that prepayments and defaults on the loans underlying
the NIMs were exceeding its expectations. This strongly suggests that GTF
should have undertaken a "special review" of its prepayment rate
assumptions and its valuation of the NIMs, and announced an addition to
reserves, at least a year before it did.
4. Delinquency and Loss Experience
GTF clearly had first hand knowledge of delinquencies in the loan
portfolio it serviced. In early 1996, GTF disclosed that its 1995 rate of
delinquencies (1.92%) and repossession losses (0.57%) were "currently at
their lowest level."'' 7 In 1996, GTF's delinquencies increased to 2.33% of
the number of loans serviced 179 and its repossession losses increased to
0.82% of the average principal amount of all loans serviced.' 80 However,
175. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., US Asset-Backeds: Advanta Units Shake Stigma; GTF Adds 0.25,
CAP. MARKET REP. (Mar. 26, 1997).
176. See 1996 GTF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 28. GTF estimated the fair value of the
NIMs exceeded carrying value by $56.6 million at December 31, 1995. See id.
177. See id. ($322 million carrying value reduced by $13 million to reflect fair value).
178. L. Asher, Green Tree Financial: Knocked the Cover off the Ball, First Call Notes (Merrill
Lynch), Jan. 30, 1996. See also, Paul A. Mackey, DWR Raises EPS Estimates & Price Target on
Green Tree Financial; Maintain Buy, First Call Notes (Dean Witter), Jan. 31, 1996 (noting that a
1.92% delinquency rate is "right in the middle of [GTF's] historic range" of 1.49% to 2.25% during
the past 12 years); David B. Hilder, Green Tree Financial: 4Q Well Above Estimate, First Call Notes
(Morgan Stanley), Jan. 31, 1996 (noting that GTF has experienced delinquency rates of 1.49% to
2,25% since 1984 and that the 1995 year-end delinquency rate of 1.92% was lower than 8 of the 11
past years).
179. See 1996 GTF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 5 (an increase from 1.92% in 1995 and
1.49% in 1994).
180. See id. (an increase from 0.60 in 1995 and 0.53 in 1994).
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GTF's 1996 provision for credit losses, as a percentage of sales, declined
from 5.3% in 1995 to 4.7% in 1996.181
In October 1997, a Minneapolis-St. Paul business newspaper reported that
GTF expected to repossess more units in 1997 than it had in 1996 and
estimated that repossession in 1997 would be 18,000 manufactured homes.182
This article suggests that GTF knew prior to the end of the third quarter of
1997 that its default and repossession rates were increasing.
The day after issuing its November 1997 press release, GTF disclosed
that during 1997 it had been using loss assumptions of 6% to 8% on new
manufactured housing loanst138-rates much higher than GTF's 4.7%
provision for credit losses at the end of 1996. Had GTF used a 6% loss
assumption in 1996, its provision for credit losses on 1996 sales of
manufactured housing loans of $5 billion would have increased by $75
million, which would have reduced GTF's 1996 income, net of taxes, by
$46.5 million; an 8% loss assumption would have reduced 1996 income, net
of taxes, by $108 million. 84
It is possible, of course, that GTF's losses on new manufactured housing
loans increased sharply beginning in 1997 or that GTF experienced a much
lower rate of losses on other kinds of loans.t 85 However, we are aware of no
changes that occurred in early 1997, in the economy in general or in the
market for manufactured housing loans, that would have precipitated a sharp
increase in defaults on manufactured housing loans. In addition, one analyst
opined in November 1997 that GTF's proposed addition to reserves "wasn't
just a result of refinancings but also of increasing defaults, particularly tied to
a new lending program that requires only a 5% down payment."' 186
Consequently, the information about defaults that GTF disclosed in
November 1997 suggests that GTF should have increased substantially its
provision for credit losses as of the end of 1996. It also suggests that, well
before November 1997, GTF knew that more manufactured housing loans
were being prepaid as a result of a significant increase in defaults.
181. See David B. Hilder, Green Tree Financial: 4Q Exceeds Forecast; Raising 1997E EPS, First
Call Notes (Morgan Stanley), Jan. 28, 1997.
182. See Tim Huber, Green Tree Sees More Delinquent Loans, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL
CITYBUSINESS, Oct. 24, 1997, at 4.
183. See M. Hughes, Green Tree: Lowering Ratings Based on Charge, First Call Notes (Merrill
Lynch), Nov. 14, 1997.
184. These are only estimates of the impact an increase in loss provisions (from 4.7% to 6% or
8%) on the sale of manufactured housing loans would have had on GTF's 1996 reported income.
185. The 1996 provision for credit losses is reflected in the aggregate for all loan types serviced
by GTF; the portion relating solely to manufactured housing loans is not separately disclosed.
186. Andrew Osterland, How Green Tree Got Prumed, BUS. WK., Dec. 1, 1997, at 37 (quoting
Jeffrey K. Eveanson of Piper Jaffray, Inc.)
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5. GTF's Assumptions in Comparison to its Competition
As we noted above, GTF disclosed in its financial statements that it
calculated gain on sale using assumptions concerning prepayments and
defaults "which it believes market participants would use" but did not
disclose the specifics of those.187 However, the day after GTF announced its
proposed addition to reserves, it did disclose that it had been moving up its
prepayment speeds on new transactions throughout 1997 as follows:188
a. 140% to 160% manufactured housing prepayment
b. 600 to 800 basis points loss assumptions
c. 11 to 11.5% discount rate
d. prepayment speeds are ramped (ramp not disclosed).' 89
One implication of this statement was that GTF had used slower prepayment
speeds prior to 1997.
Data available to us suggested that GTF's assumptions were more
aggressive than those used by its competitors. 190 A report by Morgan Stanley
noted that GTF's projected adjustment to reserves would have been 50%
smaller had GTF been using discount rates similar to those used by its
competitors.' 91 However, because GTF had previously disclosed the discount
rate it used to calculate gain on sale, we did not believe a claim of disclosure
187. 1996 GTF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 9.
188. See M. Hughes, Green Tree: Lowering Rating Based on Charge, First Call Notes (Merrill
Lynch), Nov. 14, 1997.
189. Ramping gives effect to the cyclical nature of prepayments over the life of a loan (i.e.,
prepayments on a portfolio will increase annually after year one, peaking in years 5-6, and then level
out for the life of the loan).
190. Oppenheimer & Co. noted in its October 20, 1997 report:
When we began covering Green Tree in fall of 1993, there were few public companies using gain-
on-sale accounting. Since then, dozens of financial services companies that use gain-on-sale
accounting have gone public. We cover 14 such specialty finance companies and over the last few
years, have gained a better understanding of gain-on-sale accounting. Part of our education has
been that the companies that employ gain-on-sale accounting have increased their disclosure
levels. We know the gain-on-sale assumptions at 13 out of these 14 companies from their 10 Qs or
conversations with management Green Tree is the sole exception.
Oppenheimer & Co. Inc., Green Tree Financial: Trimming Estimates Because of Decline in Gain-on-
Sale Margin (Oct. 20, 1997).
We reviewed Forms 10-K filed by several other specialty finance companies that use gain on sale
accounting in an effort to ascertain the assumptions they used, but were not able to find the details of
any of their assumptions. Our assumption is that those companies disclosed information about their
assumptions in meetings with analysts from Oppenheimer and other companies.
191. See Kenneth Posner, Mortgage Lenders: Implications of Green Tree Residual Valuation
Charge, First Call Notes (Morgan Stanley), Nov. 17, 1997 (noting that discount rates used by Ocwen,
Countrywide and INMC Mortgage for subprime home equity and manufactured housing loan
securitization ranged from 18% to 23%).
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fraud could be made on the basis of the difference between the (fully-
disclosed) discount rate used by GTF and the rates used by its competitors. 192
We also ascertained that one of GTF's competitors, INMC Mortgage,
used a prepayment assumption of more than 10% of the constant prepayment
rate ("CPR"), whereas GTF announced that it was increasing its stabilized
CPR prepayment assumption from 6% to 9%.193 An analyst at Oppenheimer
concluded that GTF's assumptions were still "inadequate" and needed to be
raised by one-third on the 1996 and 1991 manufactured housing pools. 94 We
did not believe, however, that this was enough to support a reasonable belief
that the prepayment assumptions used in 1996 and 1997 were fraudulent.
INMC Mortgage may have competed in the same market as GTF, but we had
no data about its (or GTF's) actual prepayment experience. Thus, the
information about INMC's assumption did not allow us to comfortably assert
that a "market participant" in GTFs position clearly would have used
prepayment assumptions different from those GTF used.
E. Evidence Suggesting Mr. Coss (and therefore GTF) had a Motive to
Deceive
Mr. Coss was the highest paid executive in the United States in both 1995
and 1996.195 He received $102 million in salary and bonuses in 1996 and
$65.6 million in salary and bonuses in 1995.196 These payments were made
pursuant to an employment agreement that GTF and Mr. Coss signed in
1991. The agreement covered the years 1992 through 1996; it provided that
GTF would pay Mr. Coss an annual base salary of $400,000 and a bonus
equal 2.5% of GTF's pretax income, payable 50% in cash and 50% in
stock. 19 7 The agreement stipulated that, for purposes of calculating the bonus,
192. See supra note 124. In addition, GTF could make a persuasive argument that choosing a
discount rate is a matter of business judgment and that the rate it used was not patently unreasonable.
193. See Kenneth Posner, Mortgage Lenders: Implications of Green Tree Residual Valuation
Charge, First Call Notes (Morgan Stanley), Nov. 17, 1997. When the MHP curve was developed in
1994, prepayments leveled off at 6% (6% CPR) in month 24. See supra note 148. The CPR is "the
percentage of the principal outstanding at the beginning of a period that prepay during the period,
expressed on an annualized basis." FABOZZI, supra note 146, at 378.
194. See Heather Timmons, Green Tree Prepayments Seen Triggering a Charge, AM. BANKER,
Dec. 18, 1997. Apparently, the manufactured housing sector experienced actual CRPs between 13.3%
and 14.3% in the summer of 1997. See Prepayments on Home-Equity ARMs, 12 MORGAGE-BACKED
SEC. LETTER (Aug. 4, 1997), available in 1997 WL 12803946.
195. See Eric S. Hardy, Executive Pay, FORBES, May 17, 1997, at 58; Eric S. Hardy, America's
Highest Paid Bosses, FORBES, May 20, 1996, at 180, 184.
196. See 1996 GTF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74.
197. See GREEN TREE FIN. CORP., EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT, KEY EXECUTIVE BONUS
PROGRAM, AND STOCK OPTION PLAN (Apr. 20, 1991) [hereinafler GTF EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT,
KEY EXECUTIVE BONUS PROGRAM, AND STOCK OPTION PLAN].
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shares of GTF stock would be valued at $23.75, their price at the date of the
agreement.198 This price would be adjusted to take account of stock splits,
stock dividends and comparable events. 199 As a result of three stock splits,
the nominal value of the shares of stock used to pay the stock portion of Mr.
Coss' bonus was reduced to $2.96875 per share by the end of 1995. This
adjustment, together with sharp increases in the price of GTF stock,
accounted in large measure for the size of Mr. Coss' bonus.
200
In April 1996, GTF and Mr. Coss entered into a new, ten year
employment agreement that took effect on January 1, 1997. The 1997
agreement increased Mr. Coss' base salary to $600,000, granted him an
option to purchase two million shares of GTF stock,20 1 and provided for an
annual bonus equal to 2.5% of GTF's net income in excess of a 12% return
on equity.
202
The difference between the basis on which Mr. Coss' bonus was
calculated under these two agreements clearly provided Mr. Coss with a
strong motive to defer until some time in 1997 making any adjustments to
GTF's prepayment and default assumptions that would reduce GTF's income
for 1996 or the value GTF assigned to its excess servicing rights receivables
and its subordinated interest in the NIMs. As CEO of GTF, Mr. Coss also
clearly had the opportunity to influence the prepayment and default
assumptions that GTF used.
F. The Bottom Line: There's a Hole in Our Theory
The information we were able to gather about GTF203 made us confident
of two things:
Information concerning (i) changes in the quality of
manufactured housing and the market for manufactured
198. See id. (the closing price for GTF's stock on the New York Stock Exchange on the day the
1991 Employment Agreement was entered into).
199. See GTF EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT, KEY EXECUTIVE BONUS PROGRAM, AND STOCK
OPTION PLAN, supra note 197.
200. That is, because GTF stock was trading at more than ten times the nominal value of the stock
used to pay Coss, the cash value of the stock portion of his bonus was more than ten times what it
would have been had the agreement provided that the number of shares payable to Coss would be
calculated using current market values.
201. See GREEN TREE FIN. CORP., CHIEF EXECUTIVE CASH BONUS AND STOCK OPTION PLAN,
Exhibit 10 to Form 10-Q (filed with the SEC on Aug. 13, 1996). The 10-year stock option plan begins
vesting in five years with an exercise price of $30.88 per share. See id.
202. See id., par. 4.1. Return on equity is computed as net income for the current year as a
percentage of equity as of the last day of the immediately preceding year, computed in accordance
with GAAP in effect at December 31, 1995.
203. We devoted about 150 hours to gathering and analyzing the information we have described.
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housing, (ii) increased competition in the market for
manufactured housing loans, (iii) changes in interest rates,
(iv) increases in defaults on manufactured housing loans,
(v) increases in the prepayment speeds GTF's underwriters
used to market GTF's pass-through certificates, and
(vi) analysts' calculations concerning GTF's actual
prepayment experience on manufactured housing loans,
considered collectively, clearly was sufficient to give rise to
a strong inference that a market participant would have
used considerably more conservative assumptions to
calculate GTF's gain on sale and to value its excess
servicing rights receivables and subordinated interest in the
NIMs in 1996 than such a market participant would have
used in the years prior to 1996. Consequently, that
information also gives rise to a strong inference that, if
GTF did not use considerably more conservative
assumptions in 1996 than it used in prior years, GTF either
recklessly or consciously issued materially false or
misleading financial statements for 1996 and the first three
quarters of 1997.
9 Mr. Coss had a motive and the opportunity to prevent GTF
from adopting considerably more conservative prepayment
and default assumptions to calculate GTF's gain on sale
and to value its excess servicing rights receivables and its
subordinated interest in the NIMs in 1996 and the first three
quarters of 1997.
Because GTF had not disclosed the prepayment and default assumptions
it used in 1996 and the first three quarters of 1997, we did not know whether
GTF in fact used substantially the same assumptions in 1996 that it used in
prior years or whether GTF modified its assumptions to take account of the
information set forth above.2°
We undertook various forms of financial analysis to attempt to "back out"
204. In a situation such as this, where the information in question relates directly to a
corporation's business operations, courts generally assume that a corporation's executives are aware of
that information and do not require plaintiffs to plead facts indicating that that was the case. See
Epstein v. Itron, Inc., No. CS-97-214-RHv, 1998 WL 54944, *10 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 22, 1998)
("[F]acts critical to a business's core operations or an important transaction generally are so apparent
that their knowledge may be attributed to the company and its key officers."); Cohen v. Koenig, 25
F.3d 1168, 1174 (2d Cir. 1994) (accepting allegation that company's officers "were 'fully familiar
with all aspects of [its] business and financial condition and operations."')
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from GTF's financial statements the assumptions it had used or whether
those assumptions had changed, but our efforts were to no avail. In its
financial statements, GTF lumped together its gains on sale, excess servicing
rights receivables and loan loss reserves for its portfolios of manufactured
housing loans, home equity and home improvement loans, and commercial
revolving credit loans. As a result, we found it impossible to estimate with
any precision GTF's assumptions concerning prepayments and defaults on
manufactured housing loans. Further complicating our calculations was the
fact that, through 1996, GTF had securitized more than 800,000
manufactured housing loans, each with its own coupon rate, maturity date,
and loan to value ratio, each of which would impact assumptions with respect
to anticipated prepayments and defaults.
By examining the monthly Forms 8-K that GTF filed, which compared
the principal balance due on one issue of NIMs (NIM Trust 1995-A) to the
value of the excess servicing rights receivables that collateralized those
NIMs, we were able to ascertain that, at some time between March 17, 1997,
and April 15, 1997, GTF apparently did revise the assumptions it was using
to value those receivables. That seemed to be the only plausible explanation
for a 19.6% decline, during that period, in the value GTF assigned to those
receivables during that period.2°5
205. At issuance, the NIMs reflected 76.9% of the collateral's estimated value ($308
million/S400.6 million). See GREEN TREE FIN. CORP., PROSPECTUS, 7.25% Securitized Net Interest
Margin Certificates (Trust 1995-A), Aug. 4, 1995. At the end of 1995, the percentage had decreased to
72.3%, and by the end of 1996, it had decreased to 71.3%. See GREEN TREE FIN. CORP., FORM 8-K,
Exhibit 99 (Jan. 19, 1996); GREEN TREE FIN. CORP., FORM 8-K, Exhibit 99 (Dec. 20, 1996). The data
for 1997 were as follows:
Payment Date Principal Balance Collateral Value Principal Balance
as % of Collateral
Jan. 17, 1997 $207,725,303 $291,388,414 71.3%
Feb. 17, 1997 $201,321,654 $287,302,525 70.1%
Mar. 17, 1997 $195,949,871 $283,669,476 69.1%
Apr. 15, 1997 $194,012,358 $227,977,765 85.1%
May 15, 1997 $191,976,187 $224,216,746 85.6%
June 16, 1997 $189,630,709 $220,682,032 85.9%
July 15, 1997 $187,680,281 $216,579,451 86.6%
Aug. 15, 1997 $186,359,006 $209,817,259 88.8%
Sept. 15, 1997 $185,512,327 $204,906,994 90.5%
Oct. 15, 1997 $184,984,147 $201,403,142 91.8%
Nov. 17, 1997 $184,411,588 $198,283,243 93.0%
Dec. 15, 1997 $181,668,388 $171,153,583 106.2%
In the 8-K filings, GTF disclosed:
Present value of the projected remaining cash flows is based on the estimated future performance
of the underlying loans. These projections are subject to ongoing evaluation based upon a number
of factors, including historical performance. As such, this projected value may change
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This apparent change was an additional indicator that GTF should have
revised its prepayment and default assumptions well before November 1997.
However, it did not allow us to draw any strong inferences as to whether
GTF had (or had not) revised the prepayment and default assumptions it used
to calculate gains on the sales of manufactured housing loans during 1996.
Because GTF's apparent revision of its assumptions did not cause the
collateral securing NIM Trust 1995-A to fall below the principal due,20 6 we
could draw no inferences from GTF's failure to write down the value of its
subordinated interest in those NIMs. In addition, it also was possible that the
make up of the pool of mortgages that generated the receivables that
collateralized those NIMs differed materially from the make up of the pools
of mortgages that GTF sold during 1996.
Consequently, the Reform Act would create a Catch-22 for a plaintiff
seeking to prosecute a claim of securities fraud against GTF.2°7 Due to the
Discovery Stay, a plaintiff would not be able to examine GTF's books and
records to ascertain whether GTF had used essentially the same prepayment
and default assumptions to prepare its financial statements for 1996 and the
first three quarters of 1997 as it had used in prior years.20 8 Yet without access
to GTF's books and records, the most we believe a plaintiff prudently could
assert would be that she conducted a diligent investigation, that she could not
ascertain from that investigation what assumptions GTF used to prepare its
financial statements for 1996 and the first three quarters of 1997, and that her
"best guess" was that GTF used substantially the same assumptions that it
used in prior years.209 The information set forth above, concerning GTF, its
business, and Mr. Coss' compensation arrangements, should be deemed
sufficient to give rise to a strong inference that GTF violated section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 if GTF used essentially the same assumptions in 1996 as it
used in prior years. But a complaint that relies on a plaintiff's "best guess" to
support a key factual allegation-that GTF used those assumptions-does
periodically, not only as a result of actual experience but also as a result of revisions made to the
assumptions upon which such projections are based.
See GREEN TREE FIN. CORP., FORM 8-K, Exhibit 99 (Jan. 17, 1997; Feb. 17, 1997; Mar. 17, 1997; Apr.
15, 1997; May 15, 1997; June 16, 1997; July 15, 1997; Aug. 15, 1997; Sept. 15, 1997; Oct. 15, 1997;
Nov. 17, 1997; Dec. 15, 1997).
The 19.6% decline is particularly significant in light of the fact that during the same one-month
period, the principal due on this issue of NIMs declined by less than 1%.
206. See supra.
207. Based on information available prior to January 27, 1998.
208. We assume that GTF, having kept those assumptions secret for many years, would not have
responded positively to a potential plaintiff's request to GTF to disclose them voluntarily.
209. We assume that she believed GTF had used those assumptions and that she further believed
that discovery would produce evidence to support her belief.
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not, in our view, satisfy the Reform Act's pleading requirements. The
question that remains, then, is how a court could-and should-deal with a
plaintiff who sought to prosecute an action for securities fraud against GTF
on the basis of such a complaint.
IV. WHAT A COURT COULD-AND SHOULD-DO
A court reasonably could conclude that plaintiffs complaint should be
dismissed because, absent particularized factual allegations that GTF used
essentially the same assumptions in 1996 that it used in prior years, the
complaint failed to negate the possibility that GTF used modified
assumptions in 1996.210 As a consequence, any claim that GTF had engaged
in securities fraud could be fairly termed speculative. True, discovery might
produce facts supporting a plaintiffs speculation, but one of Congress'
principal objectives in passing the PSLRA was to protect defendants from
discovery conducted by plaintiffs seeking to corroborate speculative claims.
Congress appreciated that the Reform Act might preclude plaintiffs from
investigating some claims that would prove to have merit but Congress
ultimately concluded that a plaintiff who is unable to plead particularized
facts sufficient to give rise to a strong inference of fraud "should not be able
to go on a 'fishing expedition' merely because, from time to time, fishing
expeditions really do catch fish."
21
'
Our case study illustrates some of the problems this line of argument
poses. The facts we developed seem more than sufficient to suggest a
reasonable possibility that GTF engaged in securities fraud. GTF
210. See, e.g., Gross v. Summa Four, Inc., 93 F.3d 987, 996 (1st Cir. 1996) (general allegation of
inflated earnings not sufficient where plaintiff did not specifically allege the amount of the putative
overstatement or the net effect it had on the company's earnings); Shushany v. Allwaste, Inc., 992 F.2d
517, 522 (5th Cir. 1993) (allegation that company had adjusted the accounting of its inventory to
inflate revenues and earnings does not sufficiently plead fraud where complaint does not explain, inter
alia, how the adjustments affected the company's financial statements and whether they were material
in light of the company's overall financial position); Roots Partnership v. Lands' End, Inc., 965 F.2d
1411, 1419 (7th Cir. 1992) (allegation that company "failed to establish adequate reserves for its
excessive and outdated inventory" does not satisfy Rule 9(b) where investor does not allege "what the
reserves were or suggest how great the reserves should have been"); Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd.,
681 F.2d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 1982) (allegation that company's failure to write down value of obsolete
equipment does not sufficiently plead fraud where plaintiff did not allege amounts at which equipment
was carried-or should have been carried-on company's books).
211. Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants and Lawyers,
51 Bus. LAW. 1009, 1068 (1996); see also John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long
and Winding Road to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335, 353
(1996) (proponents of reform sought to screen out both claim that were frivolous and those that were
speculative).
1998]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
subsequently disclosed additional information that suggests a considerably
stronger possibility of fraud. But if courts interpret the Reform Act to require
the dismissal of every complaint that fails to allege with sufficient
particularity every fact critical to a claim of fraud, corporations like GTF will
have a strong incentive to delay or avoid disclosure of information, within
their exclusive control, that will allow plaintiffs to fill holes in otherwise
untenable complaints.
More importantly, pre-Reform Act case law suggests that there are likely
to be numerous situations in which, absent some discovery, plaintiffs with
potentially meritorious claims will find it impossible to plead facts with
sufficient particularity to satisfy the Reform Act's pleading requirements.212
As a consequence, strict interpretation of those requirements will undermine
another of Congress' goals-preserving the ability of private securities
litigation to compensate investors who have been defrauded and to deter
wrongdoing in American securities markets.2 I3
To avoid such results, courts may well be inclined to deny a motion to
dismiss where a plaintiff has filed a well-documented complaint that suggests
a strong possibility of fraud, but that includes one or more allegations a
plaintiff cannot substantiate because the defendants control the relevant
information. Courts imbued with the values of a notice pleading system that
for sixty years has emphasized that no complaint should be dismissed unless
"it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support
of his claim which would entitle him to relief'214 are likely to find this option
especially attractive. True, courts have applied Rule 9(b)'s more stringent
pleading requirements to claims of fraud, but generally they have held that a
plaintiff satisfies Rule 9(b) if she makes "allegations [concerning facts that]
lie peculiarly within the opposing parties' knowledge and [those allegations]
are accompanied by information that raises a strong inference of fraud. 215
As Judge Richard Posner recently explained in a RICO case governed by
Rule 9(b):
We don't want to create a Catch-22 situation in which a complaint is
dismissed because of the plaintiff's inability to obtain essential
212. See Hillary A. Sale, Still "Pleading"for the Reform of Securities Litigation, 76 WASH. U.
L.Q. 537 (1998).
213. See supra text accompanying note 12.
214. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,45-46 (1957).
215. Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990); see also In re Crafmatic Sec. Litig.,
890 F.2d 628, 646 (3d Cir. 1990) (allowing plaintiffs to proceed on the basis of unsubstantiated
allegations made on information and belief when "the necessary information lies within defendants'
control").
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information without pretrial discovery (normally of the defendant,
because the essential information is in his possession and he will not
reveal it voluntarily) that she could not conduct before filing the
complaint. But Rule 9(b) is relaxed upon a showing of such
inability.... Rule 9(b) is satisfied by a showing that further particulars
of the alleged fraud could not have been obtained without
discovery.
216
The Third Circuit has gone further. It requires a plaintiff to make an
"effort to obtain, before filing the complaint, the information needed to plead
with particularity" 217 and stipulates that a plaintiffs effort should involve
"thoroughly investigat[ing] all possible sources of information, including but
not limited to all publicly available relevant information... ,,28 If a plaintiff
then cannot plead facts sufficient to create a strong inference, she still will be
allowed to proceed if she delineates "the nature and scope" of her efforts to
develop such facts.219
Our efforts to ascertain GTF's prepayment and default assumptions,
described in Part IH,220  would appear to satisfy this requirement.
Nonetheless, we do not believe that a complaint should be held to satisfy the
Reform Act's pleading requirements if it depends, at its core, on a plaintiffs
"best guess" that GTF used assumptions that it knew or should have known
were outdated. A decision denying a motion to dismiss such a complaint and
allowing a plaintiff to proceed with discovery cannot be reconciled with
Congress' basic goal of ensuring that defendants will not be forced to incur
the costs associated with discovery unless plaintiffs "state with particularity
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant" engaged in fraud.
Moreover, if courts were to create an "unavailable facts" exception for a
216. Emery v. American General Fin., Inc., 134 F.3d 1321, 1323 (7th Cir. 1998). See also Katz v.
Household Int'l, Inc., 91 F.3d 1036, 1040 (7th Cir. 1996); In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig.,
114 F.3d 1410, 1418 (3d Cir. 1997); Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1279 n.3
(D.C. Cir. 1994); Devaney v. Chester, 813 F.2d 566,569 (2d Cir. 1987).
217. Shapiro v. UJB Financial Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 284 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 934
(1992).
218. Id. In an earlier case where plaintiffs had alleged simply that "there was no reasonable basis"
for defendants' projections, the Third Circuit held:
Under a flexible application of Rule 9(b), plaintiffs need not necessarily allege the specific
information at defendants' disposal at the time the projections were made. However, plaintiffs
must accompany their allegations with facts indicating why the charges against defendants are not
baseless and why additional information lies exclusively within defendants' control.
Craftmatic, 890 F.2d at 646. The court held that plaintiffs' complaint did not satisfy Rule 9(b) and
remanded to allow plaintiffs an opportunity to replead.
219. Id.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 125-94.
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complaint similar to the one we could have been filed against GTF, reasoning
that it reflects considerable effort on the part of a plaintiff and suggests at
least a reasonable possibility that fraud has occurred, a substantial danger
exists that this exception soon will swallow up the Act's defendant-protective
rules.
From the point of view of a plaintiffs' attorney, the lowest cost route to
finding out whether a corporation knew or recklessly disregarded certain
material information at the time the corporation made an allegedly false or
misleading statement, almost always will be to obtain access to the
corporation's books and records.22t Were courts to allow a plaintiff to begin
discovery whenever she alleged that she had conducted a thorough
investigation and was not able to substantiate facts central to her claim
because the relevant information was under defendants' exclusive control,
plaintiffs' attorneys predictably would begin to file large numbers of
complaints containing exactly such allegations. Plaintiffs' attorneys would
find that strategy particularly attractive because such complaints would
create a dilemma for defendants. The most effective way for a defendant to
discredit a plaintiff's claim, in many cases, would be to point to publicly
available information that a plaintiff could have acquired had she conducted
a diligent investigation. But in so discrediting a plaintiffs claim, a defendant
would end up providing a plaintiff with a road map to where she could find
information relevant to defendant's alleged fraud.
In short, if a court's only options were to grant or deny a motion to
dismiss, the Reform Act would appear to create a Catch-22 in cases where a
plaintiff files a complaint that sets forth substantial information suggesting
fraud but where she also is unable to document certain aspects of her claim
because defendants control the relevant information. However the court
rules, it would likely frustrate an important purpose of the Reform Act. If
courts dismiss all such complaints, much fraud will go unremedied. If courts
interpret the All Facts and Strong Inference Requirements in a relaxed
fashion and deny motions to dismiss, corporate and other defendants will
again be required to incur substantial costs to respond to speculative claims.
There is no way to interpret the Reform Act's pleading requirements, in our
view, that will allow courts to escape from this box.
However, courts can interpret the Discovery Stay so as to eliminate this
Catch-22. Recall that the Reform Act directs a court to stay all discovery in a
securities class action unless it "finds upon the motion of any party that
particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent
221. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
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undue prejudice to that party."'222 The only legislative history discussing this
provision suggests it would be appropriate to allow discovery when "the
terminal illness of an important witness might require the deposition of the
witness prior to the ruling on the motion to dismiss., 223 This example clearly
pertains to the first exception and provides no indication of what Congress
believed constitutes "undue prejudice" that would justify granting a plaintiff
permission to conduct "particularized discovery."
In our view, a court should find that a plaintiff who set forth the facts
concerning GTF that we set forth in Part HI would be unduly prejudiced by
the discovery stay and should be allowed to take discovery of GTF limited to
ascertaining the assumptions GTF used to prepare its 1996 financial and
whether they were substantially the same as the assumptions GTF used in
22prior years. 24 More generally, we believe that a plaintiff should be deemed
to be unduly prejudiced and should be allowed to take particularized
discovery where she (i) alleges particularized facts sufficient to make out
almost all the elements of a claim of securities fraud; (ii) asserts, in a manner
that the court concludes is plausible, that she has made a diligent effort to
obtain the remaining information necessary to flesh out her claim and that
such information, if it exists, can be obtained only from defendant;225 and
(iii) further asserts that she has a good faith belief that particularized
discovery will produce the evidence necessary to flesh out her claim and
pleads particularized facts (such as the information concerning Mr. Coss'
incentive compensation arrangements) sufficient to convince a court that her
belief is reasonable. The court also should allow a plaintiff to amend her
complaint to reflect the results of discovery. But if, after discovery, a plaintiff
is still unable to state a claim that meets the Reform Act's stringent pleading
standards, the court should dismiss her complaint with prejudice.
222. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3XB) (Supp. II 1996) (emphasis added).
223. Conf. Rep., supra note 2, at 70.
224. We are not convinced that the first complaint filed against GTE, Chill v. Green Tree
Financial Corp., No. 97-CV-2666 (D. Minn. filed Dec. 2, 1997), contains information that would
satisfy these conditions. The bulk of that complaint is made up of quotations of statements made by
GTF and by securities analysts about GTF. The complaint's allegations of fraud, see, e.g. 61, are
stated in conclusory terms. Moreover, to the extent that they turn on information concerning
prepayments that GTF is alleged to have "revealed in a conference call to analysts on Friday,
November 14, 1997," id., we were unable to locate in the complaint any description of, quotation
from, or source for that alleged conversation. We did not review plaintiffs' amended complaint, filed
after GTF's January 1998 press release, to determine whether it includes more detail.
225. Or some identified third party. The discovery stay applies to discovery of third parties as well
as discovery of defendants. See In re Grand Casinos, Inc. See. Litig., 988 F. Supp. 1270 (D. Minn.
1997) (granting plaintiffs leave to serve subpoenas duces tecum upon third parties for sole purpose of
ensuring that they will preserve relevant documents). Cases may arise in which a third party, rather
than defendant, controls some piece of evidence critical to plaintiff's claim.
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Medical Imaging Centers ofAmerica, Inc. v. Lichtenstein,226 the only case
that addresses the question of what constitutes "undue prejudice" sufficient to
justify lifting the discovery stay to allow a party to take particularized
discovery, supports our approach.227 There the court held that "'undue
prejudice' means improper or unfair detriment," which is "something less
than 'irreparable harm.'
228
The Court finds that such an interpretation is not only consistent with
a plain reading of the statute, but is also consistent with both the
underlying objectives of the securities law in general and with the
stated purposes of the Reform Act. The introductory paragraphs of the
Statement of Managers for the Reform Act noted that Congress, in
passing this new legislation, was "prompted by significant evidence of
abuse in private securities lawsuits," which Congress found to include,
"the abuse of the discovery process to impose costs so burdensome
that it is often economical for the victimized party to settle." Congress
also noted, however, the broader purpose of the federal securities laws,
"to protect investors and to maintain confidence in the securities
markets, so that our national savings, capital formation and investment
may grow for the benefit of all Americans." Using an "undue
prejudice" standard in applying the exception to the statutory
discovery stay appropriately attempts to balance the competing
concerns of maintaining truth and integrity in the marketplace while
curbing meritless litigation.229
Moreover, the court also stated: "If in fact, [plaintiff] had shown that the
discovery stay would prejudice it because the [defendants] would be shielded
from eventual liability for any material violations of the securities laws, the
Court would find that an 'undue prejudice' exception to the statutory stay had
been shown. 230
226. 917 F. Supp. 717 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
227. Medical Imaging Centers was an injunctive action. However, in In re Glenayre
Technologies, Inc. Sec. Litig., 982 F. Supp. 294, 299, n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), the court granted
defendants' motion to dismiss, but noted that it had "asked plaintiffs whether limited discovery...
would aid plaintiffs in meeting the stringent PSLRA requirements" and that "[r]ather than accept this
offer, plaintiffs asserted that they believe the amended Complaint meets the requirements."
228. Medical Imaging, 917 F. Supp. at 720.
229. Id. at 720-21 (citations omitted).
230. Id. at 721 n.3. However, given the circumstances in which the motion was made, which
involved an effort by a corporation to enjoin certain shareholders who were seeking to elect an
alternate slate of directors, the court held plaintiffs would have an adequate opportunity to take
discovery, "following a favorable resolution of the Motion to Dismiss, ... prior to the preliminary
injunction hearing or the special shareholders meeting." Id.
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Michaels Building Co. v. Ameritrust Co., N.A.,231 followed a very similar
approach. Four class actions involving RICO claims were filed against a
number of banks. Plaintiffs alleged that they had agreed to pay interest to the
banks at rates keyed to the "prime rate," which generally was understood to
mean the rate of interest a bank charges its best commercial customers.
Plaintiffs further alleged that the banks had defrauded them by posting
"prime rates" of interest higher than the rates the banks actually were
charging their best commercial customers.z32 The banks declined to answer
plaintiffs' interrogatories, secured a stay of discovery, and moved to dismiss
on the grounds that plaintiffs' claims relied on generalized allegations that
the banks had made below-prime loans to preferred customers but contained
no particulars of those loans. Plaintiffs' counsel admitted "that he was unable
to provide the names of favored borrowers, but urged that he not be shut out
for that reason." 233 The district court nonetheless dismissed the complaints
with prejudice, holding that Rule 9(b) requires details such as the names of
customers, the amounts of loans and the interest actually charged.234
The court of appeals reversed. It acknowledged "the dilemma of the trial
judge who struggles to sketch lines separating what are strike suits and
.235
illegitimate complaints from claims which bear more credibility." But in
this case, the court concluded, "the court below was too exacting."
236
We will not demand clairvoyance from pleaders. Corporate entities
who jealously guard the names of their clients or other information, as
they should, would be forever victorious in their motions to dismiss
under Rule 9(b) if courts demanded the level of specificity at issue in
this stage of a case. We are reluctant to punish the plaintiffs for their
ignorance of a specific factual detail, as long as defendants have
adequate notice of why they are being sued and are capable of
preparing a responsive pleading. If some limited discovery has been
taken (under a protective order if necessary), and the district court
learns that in fact plaintiffs are still unable to produce the names of
favored borrowers, then the action may be properly disposed of.
23 7
231. 848 F.2d 674 (6th Cir. 1988).
232. See id. at 676.
233. Id. at 681.
234. See id. at 677-79.
235. Id. at 681.
236. Id.
237. Id. See also Nichols v. Merrill Lynch, 706 F. Supp. 1309, 1350 (N.D. Tenn. 1990) (where
complaint included only conclusory allegations concerning defendant Laventhol but also provided "a
reasonable basis exists for inferring that defendant Laventhal could have been a party to the fraud
alleged in the complaint," court dissolved discovery stay and granted plaintiffs 90 days to conduct
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We consider it important that in Michaels, the surrounding facts and
circumstances clearly supported plaintiffs' belief that the defendant banks
had made loans at less than prime. Banks compete vigorously for the
business of big corporate customers who, in turn, are quite sensitive to the
interest rates banks charge. There were widespread reports that large banks
around the country had been making loans to their best corporate customers
at rates well below their published prime.238 Consequently, it seemed very
likely that the defendant banks had succumbed to the same competitive
pressures that had led their rivals to make loans below prime.
In addition, as Michaels pointed out, if the defendants had not made such
loans, that fact would soon become obvious and the plaintiffs' claims would
be dismissed. Consequently, allowing the plaintiffs to proceed was not likely
to burden innocent defendants unduly.
The approach we recommend clearly creates some advantages for
plaintiffs, at least in cases where courts otherwise would dismiss their
complaints. Our approach, however, also creates advantages for defendants.
First, there is the risk that, if courts do not view allowing particularized
discovery as a viable alternative, they will decide to give plaintiffs the
"benefit of the doubt" and deny motions to dismiss complaints that they think
have some merit.239 Defendants in such cases, even if they are confident the
facts do not support plaintiffs claim, then will be forced to bear the costs of
full-scale discovery before they can file a motion for summary judgment.240
A defendant clearly would be better off, in such a situation, if the court
allowed her to point out that the plaintiff is relying on an unsubstantiated
allegation to support some critical element of her claim and to move to
dismiss, subject to allowing the plaintiff to conduct discovery limited to the
subject matter of that allegation. Consider In re Silicon Graphics Securities
discovery and file amended complaint.); Eaby v. Richmond, 561 F. Supp. 131 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (where
plaintiffs had made sufficiently particularized allegations to support most of their RICO claim, but
lacked specific information about the nature of an alleged racketeering enterprise, court granted
plaintiffs leave to conduct discovery for 60 days and to amend their complaint, after which defendants
could renew their motions to dismiss).
238. See Daniel Hertzberg, Challenges to Prime Rate as Base For Loans Stir Fears Among Banks,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 1984, available in 1984 WL-WSJ 240403.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 214-15.
240. Defendants also run the not insubstantial risk that, in the course of discovery, plaintiffs will
become aware of information that will support claims of securities fraud different from those set forth
in their initial or amended complaints. Several of the attomeys interviewed by one of the authors
remarked that a skilled plaintiffs' attorney obtains access to a large volume of corporate books and
records almost always will be able to find references to some arguably material fact that was known to
the corporation and that arguably should have been disclosed. As a consequence, settlements
frequently reflect not the litigation risks associated with the claims plaintiffs initially asserted but the
risks associated with claims that, after discovery, they would be able to assert.
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Litigation.24' One of the plaintiffs' central claims was that Silicon Graphics
had failed to disclose problems it was experiencing in producing its most
important new product, the Indigo2 IMPACT workstation. Plaintiffs alleged
that Silicon Graphics' management had received "internal reports" detailing
those problems and that Silicon Graphics had issued "stop ship" orders with
respect to Indigo2 IMPACT workstations. However, the plaintiffs provided
no specifics concerning the dates, sources, or authors of the internal reports
or the dates and contents of the "stop ship" orders. Defendants, relying on the
incorporation by reference doctrine,2 42 attempted to demonstrate that the
alleged Indigo2 Impact "stop ship" reports did not exist by filing an affidavit
attached to which were "all the stop ship reports issued [by Silicon Graphics]
during the class period".243
The court held that these reports were "arguably outside the scope of the
pleadings and should not be considered in evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss."244 The court ultimately granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss because the plaintiffs' allegations were "too generic to create a strong
inference of fraud under the [Reform Act], 245 but that ruling is now the
focus of the plaintiffs' pending appeal. It strikes us that it would have been
far more efficacious, from the defendants' point of view, for the court to have
allowed the plaintiffs' to discover all "stop ship" orders and to depose two or
three Silicon Graphics officials concerning whether any "stop ship" or
comparable orders, relating to the Indigo2 IMPACT workstation, had been
issued during the class period.246 First, an appeal-and the possibility of a
reversal and repnand-might have been avoided. More importantly, either the
plaintiffs would have succeeded in confirming that they had a valid claim, or
the defendants would have demonstrated dispositively that the plaintiffs'
claims were based on mere speculation.247
241. 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997), appeal docketed, No. 97-16204 (9th Cir. July 9, 1997).
242. This doctrine allows a defendant to attach to a motion to dismiss documents referred to in the
complaint that are central to plaintiff's claim. See Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994);
Venture Assoc. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993); Kramer v. Time
Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991).
243. Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 759.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 767. For a fuller description of the parties' maneuvering in Silicon Graphics, see D. M.
Osborne, Getting Back at Lerach, AM. LAW. 49 (Sept. 1997).
246. Assuming that either defendants consented to such limited discovery or plaintiffs (i) alleged
particularized facts sufficient to make out the other elements of a claim relating to the Indigo2
IMPACT workstation; (ii) plausibly claimed that they had made diligent efforts to obtain the stop ship
reports but and that those reports are under the control of defendants; and (iii) demonstrated that they
had reasonable grounds to believe that "stop ship" reports were issued. See supra text accompanying
notes 222-25.
247. See Osborne, supra note 245, at 53 (reporting that defendants' attorney was convinced
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We recognize that, if courts begin to interpret the Discovery Stay as we
suggest, the danger exists that plaintiffs will claim undue prejudice in
virtually every case in which they suspect fraud but cannot easily ferret out
facts that to give rise to a strong inference of fraud.248 But our proposal is not
that a plaintiff should be allowed to take discovery in every such case. A
plaintiff must be able to show that defendants control information critical to
her claim and also must (i) plead particularized facts sufficient to make out
most elements of a claim of securities fraud; (ii) show that she has made a
diligent effort to obtain the remaining information necessary to flesh out her
claim; and (iii) convince the court that she has reasonable grounds to believe
that particularized discovery will produce that information.249
One question remains. Assuming some plaintiffs will be able to show
undue prejudice, will they also be able to develop suitably limited discovery
requests?250 It is difficult to answer this question in the abstract; the nature of
the information that a plaintiff will be seeking will vary considerably from
case to case. We can, however, suggest what we believe would be a suitably
limited discovery request directed at GTF.
That request would have three parts: interrogatories, a document request,
and depositions. The interrogatories would ask GTF to set forth the
assumptions it used, concerning prepayments, delinquencies and defaults.
The interrogatories would require GTF to calculate gain on sale and the value
of its excess servicing rights receivables and its subordinated interest in the
NIMs for each quarter from the first quarter of 1994 through the third quarter
of 1997. The document request would ask GTF to provide a. copy of every
document that sets forth those assumptions for each of those quarters.
To verify the information received, depositions would be sought from
Edward L. Finn, who served as GTF's chief financial officer during the
"plaintiffs were merely speculating about the ["stop ship"] report.").
248. As we have pointed out, see supra text accompanying notes 26-27, the easiest way for a
plaintiff to develop a claim of fraud often is to obtain access to defendants' files.
249. Our proposal will not help plaintiff in a situation where defendants control almost all
information that suggests fraud. However, we believe such situations are rare. In most situations in
which fraud has occurred, we believe plaintiffs should be able to develop sufficient information,
without discovery, to be meet either the Act's pleading standards or the test for showing "undue
prejudice" that we suggest. To be sure, there will be cases in which plaintiffs will not be able to find
such information and fraud will go undeterred. In such cases, Congress' decision to insulate
defendants from the high cost of responding to speculative claims will generate other, more systemic
costs. See Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type HI Error, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711 (1996).
250. The Discovery Stay allows a court that finds "undue prejudice" to order "particularized
discovery." Congress' use of that term, we believe, makes clear that such discovery must be limited in
scope as well as duration.
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period in question.25' Depositions would also be sought from Mr. Coss, and
the individual (to be identified after Mr. Finn and Mr. Coss are deposed) who
had primary responsibility for calculating GTF's gain on sale, the value of its
excess servicing rights receivables and its subordinated interest in the NIMs
for each of those quarters. However, depositions would be limited to (i)
questions relating to deponents' knowledge of the assumptions GTF used to
calculate its gain on sale, the value of its excess servicing rights receivables,
and its subordinated interest in the NIMs for each of those quarters; (ii)
deponents' responsibilities with respect to developing, reviewing or revising
those assumptions; and (iii) deponents' knowledge of the other persons at
GTF responsible for developing, reviewing or revising those assumptions or
for calculating GTF's gain on sale, the value of its excess servicing rights
receivables, and its subordinated interest in the NIMs for each of those
quarters.252
Similarly constrained and targeted discovery, we believe, has the potential
to eliminate the Catch-22 that otherwise will arise in numerous other
situations where substantial evidence suggests that securities fraud has
occurred.
251. See Complaint, Chill v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., No. 97-CV-2666, 10 (D. Minn. filed Dec. 2,
1997).
252. If the information produced through discovery allowed plaintiff to fill in the "hole" in her
complaint and state a valid claims against GTF, plaintiff would, of course, then be entitled to conduct
all appropriate additional discovery. If it did not, her complaint would be dismissed.
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